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EASING THE CREDIT CRUNCH: A "FUNCTIONAL" 
APPROACH TO LENDER CONTROL LIABILITY 
UNDER CERCLA 
Patricia A. Shackelford* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Dry cleaners, gas stations, pharmacies, and wallpapering busi-
nesses are finding it difficult to obtain operational financing. 1 At first 
glance, their plight seems inexplicable. All four types of business 
appear to be benign commercial undertakings. Beneath their inno-
cent appearances, however, lies the potential for environmental lia-
bilities. They all use hazardous materials in either their processes 
or their products.2 The use and eventual disposal of hazardous ma-
terials may invoke a hazardous waste liability law known as the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (CERCLA).3 Moreover, CERCLA's reach is not 
limited to the owner or operator of a business.4 Commercial lenders 
• Managing Editor, 1991-1992, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
1 136 CONGo REC. E1023-24 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990) (statement of Rep. LaFalce); A Lending 
Squeeze on Small Firms, NATION'S Bus., May 1990, at 52,52 [hereinafter Lending Squeeze]; 
see also Real Estate Lawyers Add Complaints in Petition to Court on Fleet Factors, 21 
[Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1250, 1250 (Nov. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Real Estate 
Lawyers]. 
2 136 CONGo REC. EI023 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990) (statement of Rep. LaFalce); Lending 
Squeeze, supra note 1, at 52; Real Estate Lawyers, supra note 1, at 1250. 
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9642 (1988). 
4 Id. § 9607(a). 
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also face the prospect of CERCLA liability. 5 This development and 
its repercussions have been labeled the lender liability crisis. 6 
Although the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has pursued only eight lenders under CERCLA,7 a far greater 
number of lenders have been the object of private party suits.8 Even 
so, environmental groups argue that, when one compares these lend-
ers to the thousands of parties held responsible for cleanup costs at 
Superfund sites, the magnitude of the lender liability crisis is over-
stated.9 What the environmental groups do not understand is that 
the crisis stems not from the numbers of lenders that courts have 
held liable but rather from the lending community's fear of potential 
liability.lO Fear of liability translates into increased risk. If the risk 
associated with a loan becomes too great, as is often the case with 
environmental risks, a lender will not make the loan. ll Thus, the 
real crisis is the lack of available credit-the current "chill in lend-
ing".12 This environmentally driven "credit crunch" has created sig-
nificant problems for many segments of the economy, especially small 
businesses. 13 
5 See id. §§ 9601(20)(A), 9607(a). In fact, the state of Pennsylvania has sued a lender of a 
wallpapering business under CERCLA. See Lending Squeeze, supra note 1, at 52. The Small 
Business Administration (SBA), a federal lending institution, loaned money to a small wall-
papering business in Pennsylvania. The business contaminated its property with glue. Id. The 
SBA foreclosed on the business and the state government has sued the SBA for cleanup costs 
associated with the contaminated property_ Id. 
6 See, e.g., Amy T. Phillips, EPA's Lender Liability Rule: A Sweetheart Deal for Bankers?, 
22 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1158, 1159-60 (Aug. 23, 1991) [hereinafter 
Sweetheart Deal]. 
7 Id. at 1159. As of December 1990, the EPA had notified over 90 lenders of their potential 
CERCLA liability. U.S. Asks Supreme Court Not to Review Fleet Factors Ruling on CER-
CLA Liability, 21 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1583, 1583 (Dec. 21, 1990) 
[hereinafter U.S. Asks Supreme Court]. At that point in time, the lending community faced 
a potential liability exceeding $100 billion. Id. 
8 See U.S. Asks Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 1583 (by end of 1990, lenders had been 
party to approximately 36 suits under CERCLA). For a discussion of the increased potential 
for private party actions against lenders, see Lender Liability Issues Attract Attention at 
Annual American Bar Association Meeting, 22 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 
1148, 1148-49 (Aug. 23, 1991) [hereinafter American Bar Association Meeting]. 
9 Sweetheart Deal, supra note 6, at 1159. 
10 Id. at 1160. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.; see also EPA Proposes Lender Liability Rule, Easing Fears of Financial Institu-
tions, 22 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 299, 299 (June 7, 1991) [hereinafter EPA 
Proposes Lender Liability Rule]; Lawmakers Say Legislation Still Necessary to Shield In-
nocent Parties from Liability, 22 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 333, 333 (June 
14, 1991); Lender Liability Blamed in Credit Crunch, 22 [Current Developments] Env't Rep_ 
(BNA) 1563, 1573 (Oct. 18, 1991). 
13 Sweetheart Deal, supra note 6, at 1160; see also Fleet Factors Complains to Supreme 
Court that CERCLA Ruling Disrupts Commercial Lending, 21 [Current Developments] Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1116, 1117 (Oct. 5, 1990); Lending Squeeze, supra note 1, at 52. 
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CERCLA contains language protecting lenders from liability so 
long as they do not participate in the management of a debtor's 
facility.14 This provision is known as the "security interest exemp-
tion".15 Judicial and administrative attempts to interpret the exemp-
tion's language have been erratic. Federal courts applying the ex-
emption have not been able to reach a consensus as to the parameters 
of acceptable lender participation. 16 The EPA's proposed rule on the 
issue of lender liability articulates a clear, workable standard of 
liability.17 Because the EPA only recently proposed its rule, how-
ever,18 the lack of guidance from the courts has left lenders uncertain 
of hidden liabilities, thereby inhibiting their willingness to extend 
credit. 19 
The security interest exemption stems in part from a theory of 
lender control liability. 20 Both the courts and the EPA recognize that 
control is a necessary element to lender liability.21 The federal courts, 
however, have adopted a generic approach22 toward the concept of 
control. 23 Some even have drawn their control analyses from other 
legal doctrines to create a general theory of lender control liability. 24 
When formulating these general theories, the courts have neglected 
to address CERCLA's objective-to deter improper disposal of haz-
14 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(1988). 
15 See, e.g., EPA Official Tells House Panel of Shift in Policy Toward Lenders, CERCLA 
Liability, 21 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 756, 756 (Aug. 10, 1990). Commen-
tators also refer to the provision as the "secured creditor exemption". See, e.g., EPA Says 
Lenders May Influence Decisions in Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues, 21 
[Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1139, 1140 (Oct. 12, 1990). 
16 See infra notes 165-295 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 29~22 and accompanying text. 
18 EPA Proposes Lender Liability Rule, supra note 12, at 299 (EPA rule proposed on June 
5, 1991). 
19 See Amy D. Marcus & Ellen J. Pollock, EPA Plans Rule to Curb Liability on Loans to 
Owners of Waste Sites, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1991, at B4, col. 4 (fear of liability prompts 
lenders to refuse credit to high risk industries, such as manufacturing with significant real 
estate assets); Eleventh Circuit Expands CERCLA Liability to Cover Secured Creditor's 
Interest in Firm, 21 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 307, 308 (June 8, 1990) 
(recent case law transforms lenders into "environmental police"); Lending Squeeze, supra note 
1, at 52 (lenders fear judicial interpretations of Superfund language). 
20 See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text. 
21 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability 
Under CERCLA; Proposed Rule and Request for Comment, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,803, 
28,809 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed June 5,1991) (rule imposes liability 
on lenders who exercise decisionmaking control, or control at the management level, over 
hazardous substances present at facility) [hereinafter Proposed Rule]; see infra note 166 and 
accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 165-295 and accompanying text. 
'" See infra notes 178-83, 215 and accompanying text. 
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ardous wastes. 25 The results of this generic approach are standards 
of lender liability that are not focused to meet CERCLA's goals. 
The generic approach also leaves lenders unclear about which indicia 
of control will trigger liability. 
This Comment argues that the courts should follow the lead of the 
EPA and apply a functional approach26 to the concept of lender 
control as it exists under CERCLA's security interest exemption. 
A functional analysis would involve identifying the objective that 
operates as the basis for CERCLA liability and analyzing indicia of 
lender control for their relevance to that objective. This functional 
approach would ensure that applications of the security interest 
exemption would achieve CERCLA's goals. Moreover, because the 
approach would provide lenders with fixed boundaries of acceptable 
lender conduct under CERCLA, a functional analysis would re-inject 
certainty into financing transactions, thereby easing the credit 
crunch. 
Section II of this Comment describes the debtor-creditor relation-
ship and, in particular, the indicia of control inherent in that rela-
tionship. Section III presents the concept of lender control liability. 
This section examines CERCLA's security interest exemption and 
the exemption's reliance on a theory of lender control liability. Sec-
tion III also discusses the generic and functional approaches to the 
concept of lender control. Section IV addresses the construction of 
the exemption by the federal courts and the EPA. Section V critiques 
the judicial formulations of the exemption for their reliance on the 
generic concept of control. This section also commends the EPA's 
proposed rule on lender liability under CERCLA for its functional 
approach to lender control liability. Finally, section VI concludes 
that courts should take a functional approach toward CERCLA's 
theory of lender control liability. This section finds that such a func-
tional analysis not only will further CERCLA's goals of holding only 
responsible parties liable for cleanup costs but also will return cer-
tainty to financing transactions. 
II. THE PRESENCE OF LENDER CONTROL IN THE DEBTOR-
CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP 
It is inherent in debtor-creditor relationships that lenders exert 
some degree of control over their debtors. 27 In a typical credit trans-
26 See infra notes 165-295 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. 
27 See William H. Lawrence, Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated 
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action, a creditor extends value--such as money, services, goods, or 
land-to a debtor.28 In return, the debtor promises to reimburse the 
creditor for the value extended by incurring a debt. 29 A creditor 
therefore exerts control over a debtor to the extent that an obligation 
is due. 3O A secured financing transaction, however, involves an even 
greater degree of lender control. 31 In this type of credit transaction, 
in addition to a promise to repay a debt, a debtor grants an interest 
in property to a creditor to secure its obligation to the creditor.32 A 
lender in this type of transaction is known as a secured creditor, 33 
and its interest in the debtor's property is labeled a security inter-
est. 34 Examples of property that can be subject to a creditor's se-
curity interest are personal property, such as equipment, inventory, 
and accounts receivable,35 and real estate. 36 Property that is subject 
to a security interest is referred to as collateral. 37 
A security interest safeguards the lender's ability to collect its 
debt; if the debtor fails to repay the debt-that is, defaults-the 
lender may proceed against the collateral to satisfy the debt. 38 This 
means that the lender may take possession of and sell the collateral 
with Applications to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing, in LENDER LIABILITY: 
DEFINITIONS, THEORIES, ApPLICATIONS 185, 188 (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1990); Jeffrey J. 
Hass, Comment, Insights into Lender Liability: An Argument for Treating Controlling 
Creditors as Controlling Shareholders, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1321, 1322--23 (1987). 
28 See Ingrid M. Hillinger & Raymond Nimmer, Commercial Transactions: Secured Fi-
nancing, 1, 3 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, second draft, on file with author). 
29 See id. at 3. 
30 See Lawrence, supra note 27, at 188. 
31 Id. 
32 See U.C.C. § 9-201(37) (1990). Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs 
transactions involving personal property and fixtures. U. C. C. § 9-101, Official Comment (1990). 
See generally RAY D. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE (1979). Real estate transactions remain governed by local real estate law. Hillinger & 
Nimmer, supra note 28, at preface. 
33 See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(m) (1990). 
34 See id. § 9-201(37). Security interests and secured creditors usually are associated with 
transactions under the UCC. Transactions involving real estate typically involve a mortgagee 
as lender and a mortgagor as debtor. MICHAEL T. MADISON & ROBERT M. ZINMAN, MODERN 
REAL ESTATE FINANCING 285 (1991). An interest in real estate securing payment of a debt 
is referred to as a mortgage. Id. at 293. This Comment, however, uses the term "security 
interest" to identify interests created under both the UCC and real estate law. Likewise, this 
Comment will use the term "secured creditor" in reference to both mortgagors and creditors 
under the UCC. 
35 See U.C.C. §§ 9-109, 9-106, 1-201(5) (1990). 
36 MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 34, at 285. 
37 Id. § 9-501 (1)(c). The UCC refers to all forms of personal property and fixtures jointly 
as collateral. See id. 
38 I d. § 9-503. 
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without judicial process. 39 The lender then may apply the proceeds 
from the sale of the collateral to the satisfaction of the indebtedness 
secured by the collateral. 40 Thus, a secured creditor's control over 
its debtor stems from the lender's interest in the debtor's property 
and a strong leveraging position in the case of default. 
In order to protect its security interest in a debtor's property, a 
lender in a secured financing transaction typically exhibits various 
indicia of lender control. 41 Control devices are readily identifiable in 
the loan documentation accompanying a secured financing or mort-
gage agreement.42 Loan documents often provide for lender control 
of not only the collateral or real estate but also the debtor's future 
financing, general business operations, and policy decisions. 43 For 
instance, an agreement may include covenants to ensure frequent 
and regular communications between a debtor and a creditor. 44 These 
covenants may require the debtor to keep the creditor informed as 
to the present location of the business and to submit operational and 
financial reports regularly to the creditor. 45 
The loan agreement may also include covenants that restrict 
debtor activity.46 Typical covenants, for example, forbid the acqui-
sition or sale of significant capital assets, alterations in the nature 
of the debtor's business, and subsequent encumbrances of the prop-
erty in which the creditor has an interest. 47 Furthermore, the agree-
ment is likely to provide a creditor with hands-on ability to monitor 
its debtor's business. 48 Loan provisions usually permit a creditor to 
39 [d. (secured creditor may take possession without judicial process if creditor can accom-
plish this without breach of peace); id. § 9-504 (secured creditor must dispose of collateral in 
a commercially reasonable manner). 
40 [d. § 9-504(1)(b). 
41 Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,803-06, 28,809 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 300) (secured creditors engage in ordinary and customary loan practices to protect their 
security interests); Lawrence, supra note 27, at 188; Hass, supra note 27, at 1323. "Undeniably 
a lender has a clear right to impose proper conditions [on the debtor] in order to enhance its 
security and increase the probability that it will be repaid: that is the essence of the lending 
business." Hass, supra note 27, at 1323 (citing James P. Koch, Bankruptcy Planning for the 
Secured Lender, 99 BANKING L.J. 788, 799 (1982)). 
42 Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,804 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300); 
Lawrence, supra note 27, at 188; Hass, supra note 27, at 1323; see also Real Estate Lawyers 
Add Complaints in Petition to Court on Fleet Factors, 21 [Current Developments] Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1250, 1250 (Nov. 2, 1990). See generally Richard T. Nassberg, Loan Documen-
tation: Basic But Crucial, 36 Bus. LAW. 843, 850-52 (1981). 
43 Lawrence, supra note 27, at 188. 
44 Hass, supra note 27, at 1326-27. 
45 [d. 
46 [d. at 1326. 
47 [d. at 1328. 
48 Nassberg, supra note 42, at 851. 
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inspect all financial and operational records, and grant access to the 
business premises. 49 
In addition to loan documentation, loan administration customarily 
provides indicia of lender control. 50 Typically, lenders will exert 
control over their debtors during the life of a loan. 51 While policing 
a loan, a lender may make recommendations to a debtor regarding 
its operations, accounting methods, or hiring practices. 52 Moreover, 
lenders often criticize debtors' business practices and require debtors 
to review or alter their procedures. 53 In addition to policing a loan, 
lenders exert substantial control during loan workouts54 and foreclo-
sure proceedings. 55 Common lender activities during a workout pe-
riod include restructuring the terms of a loan obligation and provid-
ing financial or operational advice, counseling, and guidance. 56 An 
even greater degree of lender control occurs during a foreclosure. 57 
For instance, a lender may "wind up" the debtor's business affairs, 
take possession of its collateral, secure the collateral from vandalism 
or theft, and prepare the collateral for sale. 58 
49 Id.; Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,804 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
300); 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.3, at 1191 
(1965). "A standard clause in any well-drafted security agreement-particularly when the 
security includes such volatile collateral as [accounts] receivables and inventory-will specify 
with particularity the secured party's right to examine the debtor's books and accounts at any 
time during the loan period." 2 GILMORE, supra, § 43.3, at 1191. 
50 See Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,803 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
300); Strock Says Focus Shifts on Enforcement, EPA Regions Must Meet National Priorities, 
21 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1284, 1284 (Nov. 9, 1990); see also In re Bergsoe 
Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668,672-73 (9th Cir. 1990); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 
732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Pa. 1989). 
61 See Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,803-04, 28,809 (1991) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 300). 
52 See, e.g., In re Teletronics Servs., Inc., 29 B.R. 139, 172 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1983); Gay 
Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285,289 (Minn. 1981); see also Proposed Rule, 
54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,800 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). "There is nothing 
inherently wrong with a creditor . . . suggesting what course of action the debtor ought to 
follow." Teletronics, 29 B.R. at 172 (citation omitted). 
63 See Hass, supra note 27, at 1328. 
64 When a debtor becomes unable to meet payment obligations under a loan, the creditor 
may offer to renegotiate the terms of the loan. This is known as a workout. MADISON & 
ZINMAN, supra note 34, at 966. 
66 See 2 GILMORE, supra note 49, § 44 (foreclosure proceedings); MADISON & ZINMAN, 
supra note 34, at 965-80 (loan workouts). 
66 MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 34, at 966-75; see also Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 
28,798,28,804,28,809 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
67 See Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,805 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
300). 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,996 
(E.D. Pa. 1985); see also EPA Official Tells House Panel of Shift in Policy Toward Lenders, 
CERCLA Liability, 21 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 756, 756 (Aug. 10, 1990). 
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Whether a security interest, loan documentation, loan administra-
tion, or the mere creation of a debt evidences lender control, secured 
creditors undoubtedly exhibit indicia of lender control. Many of these 
instances of lender control are commonplace in a debtor-creditor 
relationship and are accepted commercial practices. 69 Regardless of 
the frequency or general acceptance of various secured lending prac-
tices, any indicia of lender control may play into the equation of 
lender liability. 
III. LENDER CONTROL LIABILITY 
A. The Generic and Functional Approaches to the Concept of 
Control 
As discussed in section II, most credit transactions impose some 
degree of control on a debtor. It is not easy therefore to use control 
as a measure of liability in the debtor-creditor relationship, because 
it is difficult to discern which indicia of lender control are objection-
able. 
Divorced from a cause of action, control is not conduct deserving 
of punishment. 6o Control only takes on legal significance when it is 
invoked by a particular legal theory.61 For instance, various legal 
doctrines, such as the common law claim of tortious interference, 
recognize that entities often abuse their positions of control. Liability 
may be premised on a need to check this excessive or abusive use 
of control. 62 Under other doctrines, such as the legal theories gov-
erning controlling shareholders of a corporation, an entity who as-
sumes control may be required by law to take on added responsibil-
ities. For instance, under corporate law, a controlling shareholder 
cannot sell its block of shares without first investigating the potential 
buyer to ensure that the buyer does not intend to "loot" the corpo-
ration. 63 Liability then provides the basis for legal intervention to 
59 See, e.g., supra note 49 and accompanying text (creditor access to debtor's records). 
60 Lawrence, supra note 27, at 188. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. See generally What Rough Beast . .. ?, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 836 (Nov. 14, 1988) 
(survey of common law claims of lender liability premised on fraud, breach of contract, duress, 
and excessive control leading to tortious interference); A.J. Herbert III, Comment, Lender 
Liability: Good Faith and Demand Notes, 64 TUL. L. REV. 187 (1989) (discussing lender 
breach of good faith with respect to demand notes). 
63 DeBaun v. First Western Bank & Trust Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1975). 
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tie these additional duties to the assumption of control. 64 In either 
scenario, the legal principle advanced determines the extent and 
nature of the legal intervention. 65 Divorced from its legal principle 
and applied in the abstract, control by itself is an untenable basis 
for liability. 66 
One commentator has identified two distinct approaches to the 
control analysis-the generic and functional approaches. 67 Rather 
than analyze the concept of control as it relates to a particular legal 
principle, a common approach is to treat control as a generic con-
cept. 68 Courts and commentators alike often view control as a single 
concept with a fixed definition that they can apply across the spec-
trum of theories that invoke a control analysis. 69 They seize a control 
analysis from one area of law, such as corporate law, and apply the 
analysis to other contexts without accommodating for the particular 
objectives and policies of these other areas of law. 70 In fact, instead 
of treating lender control as one of the necessary elements in a 
liability analysis, the tendency is to treat lender control itself as a 
basis for liability. 71 
A functional approach, in comparison, seeks to understand the 
underlying purposes that theories of liability intend to serve. 72 All 
doctrines of liability, whether set forth by statute or common law, 
have the objective of promoting or inhibiting certain conduct. 73 The 
functional analysis requires identification of this objective. 74 Once a 
court determines the objective that is the basis for liability under a 
particular theory, the court then must analyze the indicia of control 
64 Id.; see also Lawrence, supra note 27, at 188. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 187, 188-93. 
68 I d. at 186. 
69 See, e.g., James P. Koch, Bankruptcy Planning for the Secured Lender, 99 BANKING 
L.J. 788, 798-99 (1982) (argues for "generic approach" to control); K. Thor Lundgren, Liability 
of a Creditor in a Control Relationship with its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 523, 549 (1984) 
(suggests application of instrumentality and agency theories of lender liability in securities 
law context); John O. Tyler, Jr., Emerging Theories of Lender Liability in Texas, 24 Hous. 
L. REV. 411, 431-38 (1987) (fails to distinguish between various legal theories of lender 
liability); Hass, supra note 27, at 1341-59 (applies principles of corporate law regarding control 
concept to context of lender control liability); see also infra notes 178-83 and accompanying 
text. 
70 Tyler, supra note 69, at 431-38; infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text. 
71 Lawrence, supra note 27, at 186. 
72 Id. at 190; see also Raymond A. Enstam & Harry P. Kamen, Control and the Institutional 
Investor, 23 Bus. LAW. 289, 307 (1968). 
73 Lawrence, supra note 27, at 187. 
74 I d. at 191. 
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in light of that objective. 75 In other words, under the functional 
analysis the court must inquire whether certain instances of control 
have led to the occurrence of the event that a particular theory of 
liability was intended to prevent. 76 Thus, control for the purposes of 
one statute, for example, may not be control under another statute. 77 
The objectionable aspects of lender control under a particular 
statute or principle of common law become apparent when courts 
recognize the functional differences among the various theories of 
lender control liability. Application of the functional analysis there-
fore limits the imposition of liability to the extent necessary to realize 
the legal theory advanced. 
Judicial analyses of lender control under the agency law theory of 
liability provide examples of both the functional and generic ap-
proaches to control. Under the common law doctrine of agency, 
lenders may be liable for the obligations of their debtors under a 
theory of lender control liability.78 Agency is a fiduciary relation 
between two entities-a principal and an agent-in which the agent 
acts on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control. 79 
The principal is held liable for acts that the agent does on its account 
and that are an integral part of or are incidental to a transaction the 
principal has authorized the agent to perform.80 Section 140 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency applies this doctrine to the debtor-
creditor relationship. According to section 140, if a creditor assumes 
control of its debtor's business, the creditor may be deemed a prin-
cipal, with liability for the acts and transactions of its debtor's op-
erations. 81 
Comment a to section 140 stresses that a creditor will not become 
a principal unless it exercises "de facto control" overthe conduct of 
its debtor.82 For instance, a secured creditor who prevents the pur-
chase or sale of goods by the debtor through an exercise of its veto 
power over the debtor's business activities has not exerted sufficient 
control to be considered a principal. 83 According to the comment, 
however, a creditor does become a principal when it takes over the 
76 [d. 
76 See Enstam & Kamen, supra note 72, at 307. 
77 [d. 
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1958). 
79 [d. § 1. 
80 [d. § 161. 
81 [d. § 140. 
82 [d. § 140 cmt. a. 
83 [d. 
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management of the debtor's business and makes contractual deci-
sions for the debtor. 84 
Although a creditor may attain principal status, it is not neces-
sarily liable for all of its debtor's obligations. Agency law liability is 
transaction-specific.85 A creditor may exert control over the debtor's 
business but direct only some of the debtor's contracts. Agency law 
governs only those transactions that fall within the scope of the 
directed activity.86 Thus, in order for liability to attach to a creditor 
as a principal, there must be a nexus between a specific debtor 
transaction and the direction and control of that transaction by the 
creditor. Whether the creditor exerts general control over the debt-
or's business is not the appropriate inquiry under agency law. 
In Buck v. Nash-Finch Co. ,87 the Supreme Court of South Dakota 
adopted a functional approach to the agency law analysis of lender 
control liability. 88 The Nash-Finch Company, a grocery wholesaler, 
lent money to a retail supermarket.89 Certain creditors of the super-
market sold and delivered merchandise to the market but were never 
paid. 90 These creditors brought suit against the Nash-Finch Com-
pany, as a principal of the market, to recover damages.91 
Recognizing that the basis for liability under agency law is lender 
control of the specific transactions in the case at bar, the Buck court 
limited its inquiry to whether the Nash-Finch Company assumed 
control over the buying of merchandise for the market.92 Because it 
was applying a functional approach, the court then scrutinized the 
indicia of lender control for their relevance to the transactions at 
issue in the case at bar. 93 
The Buck court found that the evidence revealed an assumption 
of control by the Nash-Finch Company and a corresponding yielding 
of and acting under such control by the market in certain areas of 
its business.94 The court, however, did not find evidence of control 
sufficiently comprehensive in scope to include the market's buying 
84 [d. 
86 Lawrence, supra note 27, at 220; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161 
cmt. a (1958). 
86 Lawrence, supra note 27, at 220. 
87 102 N.W.2d 84 (S.D. 1960). 
88 [d. at 90-92. 
89 [d. at 85. 
90 [d. at 84. 
91 [d. 
92 [d. at 90. 
93 [d. 
94 [d. at 89-90. 
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activities. The court concluded that, because there was insufficient 
evidence of lender control over the market's merchandising trans-
actions, the Nash-Finch Company could not be liable as a principal 
under agency law for the claims of the market's unpaid creditors. 95 
In contrast to the Buck court, the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
adopted the generic approach to the concept of control when it faced 
the issue of lender liability under an agency law analysis. In Gay 
Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc. ,96 Warren Grain & Seed Company, 
a grain elevator, had purchased and stored grain from local farmers. 97 
Warren defaulted on contracts it had made with the farmers for the 
sale of grain, and the farmers brought suit to recover their losses.98 
The farmers also sued Cargill, Warren's sole creditor. 99 The Jenson 
Farms court upheld a jury finding that Cargill was Warren's prin-
cipal and therefore jointly liable on the transactions with the farm-
ers. 1OO 
The Jenson Farms court premised Cargill's liability on factors 
that indicated de facto control of the debtor's operations. 101 The 
court, however, did not identify any factors that would suggest 
lender control over the specific transactions upon which the farmers 
had sued. According to the court, there were nine factors that in-
dicated Cargill's control over Warren: Cargill's constant recommen-
dations to Warren;102 Cargill's right of first refusal on sales of War-
ren's grain; Warren's inability to mortgage property, purchase stock, 
or pay dividends without Cargill's consent; Cargill's right of entry 
onto Warren's premises for purposes of inspection; Cargill's criticism 
of its debtor's finances, officer's salaries, and inventory; Cargill's 
comment that Warren needed "strong paternal guidance"; provision 
to Warren of forms with Cargill's letterhead; Cargill's financing of 
all Warren's grain purchases and operating expenses; and Cargill's 
power to cease financing. 103 None of these factors supported the 
court's conclusion that Cargill directed Warren's grain transactions 
with the farmers. In fact, as the court itself noted, many of these 
indicia of control were typical of a debtor-creditor relationship, such 
95 [d. at 90-91. 
96 309 N.W.2d 285,290-93 (Minn. 1981). 
97 [d. at 298. 
98 [d. at 287-88. 
99 [d. 
100 [d. at 293. 
WI [d. at 291. 
102 [d. at 289 n.4 (debtor never implemented recommendations). 
loa [d. at 291. 
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as the lender's power to cease financing, and its right of entry onto 
the the debtor's property. 104 
Nonetheless, the Jenson Farms court found that the totality of 
circumstances surrounding Cargill's financing of Warren suggested 
a general control of the debtor's operations. 105 The court did not rest 
Cargill's liability on a finding of lender control over the specific 
transactions upon which the liability was based-the appropriate 
inquiry under agency law. Instead, the court based liability on Car-
gill's general control as a lender. In other words, the court did not 
tie the concept of control to the underlying theory of agency law 
liability and thus premised liability on a generic understanding of 
control. 106 
B. A Statutory Basis for Lender Control Liability: CERCLA and 
the Security Interest Exemption 
A number of theories premise liability, in part, on lenders' control 
of their debtors. Versions of the concept of lender control liability 
exist among the common law doctrines of agency law,107 corporate 
law,108 equity,109 and torts. 110 Lenders may incur control liability 
under a variety of federal statutes as well. For instance, judicial 
interpretations of federal securities lawslll and the Internal Revenue 
Code112 pose substantial control issues for lenders. Statutes regulat-
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 290-93; see also Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 474 N.Y.S.2d 79, 
80-81 (N. Y. App. Div. 1984) (court found lender to be principal of debtor and thus liable for 
fuel deliveries to debtor because lender exerted extensive control over debtor's operations). 
107 See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text. Under agency law, a lender who assumes 
control over a debtor's conduct or business may be held liable for the obligations of the debtor. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1958). 
108 See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chern. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 
1104-07 (5th Cir. 1973) (under instrumentality rule, lending corporation may be held liable if 
it dominates or controls subservient corporation to extent that subservient corporation man-
ifests no separate corporate existence and functions solely to achieve purposes of lending 
corporation). 
109 See, e.g., In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co., 893 F.2d 693, 699-703 (5th Cir. 1990) (to justify 
application of doctrine of equitable subordination, lender's control over debtor's affairs must 
rise to level of unconscionable conduct). 
110 See Lawrence, supra note 27, at 185-86 n.1 & n.3. 
111 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1988) (definition of control at 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 
(1991»; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988) (definition of control at 17 
C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1991». 
112 I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1988); Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26, 30~1 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). Courts interpret the term "person" broadly to include 
persons responsible for controlling corporate tax disbursements. See, e.g., Pacific Nat'l Ins. 
Co., 422 F.2d at 3~1. 
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ing certain communications and transportation industries also allow 
for lender liability suits. 113 As a result of CERCLA, environmental 
law too now furnishes a statutory basis for the imposition of control 
liability on lenders. 114 
CERCLA created a mechanism for responding to the potential 
and actual environmental and public health hazards that releases of 
hazardous substances into the environment pose. 115 CERCLA gen-
erally is recognized as providing the statutory authority for federal 
cleanups of hazardous waste disposal sites. 116 Both the EPA and 
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) carry out these response ac-
tivities, ll7 which are defined as those actions that are necessary to 
remove or remedy a release or threatened release of a hazardous 
substance. 118 
The United States will spend an estimated $500 billion over the 
next fifty years to remediate hazardous waste sites. 119 The Hazard-
ous Substance Response Trust Fund,120 also known as the Super-
fund, will finance a large percentage of these response actions. Gov-
ernment actions to recover response costs from PRPs replenish the 
Superfund. 121 CERCLA designates four categories of persons who 
are strictly liable for response costS. 122 It imposes liability on trans-
113 See Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 314 (1988); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 
U.S.C. §§ 11343-11346 (1988). 
114 42 U.S.C § 9607(a) (1988). But see id. § 9601(20)(A) (security interest exemption). 
115 See United States v. Consolidated Rail Co., 729 F. Supp. 1461, 1467 (D. Del. 1990). 
116 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988) (authorizing President to respond to threatened releases of 
hazardous substances). For a discussion of the inadequacies of previous legal response mech-
anisms that prompted the enactment ofCERCLA, see S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
2 (1980), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND) 305,308-19 (Comm. 
Print 1983) [hereinafter CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
117 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1988); Exec. Order No. 12580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987). 
118 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)....(25) (1988). 
119 Thomas Jaffe, Whose Mess is This?, FORBES, Feb. 19, 1990, at 43, 43, reprinted in 136 
CONGo REC. E1024-25 (daily ed. April 4, 1990) (statement of Rep. LaFalce). 
120 26 U.S.C. § 9507(a) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)....(b) (1988). 
121 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
122 [d. § 9601(32). CERCLA adopts its standard of liability from § 311 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). [d.; see also 126 
CONGo REC. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio) (CERCLA should 
impose a standard of strict liability as found in other environmental acts), reprinted in 1 
SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 164 (Helen Needham & Mark Menefee eds., 1982) 
[hereinafter SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Case law supports this conclusion. E.g., 
New York V. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1985); Versatile Metals, 
Inc. V. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1572 (E.D. Pa.' 1988); United States V. Bliss, 667 F. 
Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Philadelphia V. Stepan Chern. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 
nA (E.D. Pa. 1982), reconsideration denied, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,007 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983). Traditional principles of common law determine issues of joint and several liability. 
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porters and generators of hazardous wastes,l23 as well as on current 
owners and operatorsl24 of a facility125 or vessel. 126 In addition, past 
owners and operators of a facility who owned or operated the facility 
at the time of disposal may be liable under CERCLA.127 The statute's 
definition of the term "owner or operator", however, contains an 
exemption providing that "[s]uch term does not include a person, 
who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, 
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest 
in the vessel or facility. "128 Both commentators and courts commonly 
126 CONGo REC. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio), reprinted in 1 
SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 164. 
123 [d. § 9607(a)(3}-(4). 
124 CERCLA originally defined the tenn "owner or operator" to mean 
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, 
such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person 
owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any abandoned facility, any 
person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility im-
mediately prior to such abandonment. 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-510, § 101(20)(A), 94 Stat. 2767, 2769 (1980). In 1986, Congress amended clause (iii) of 
this definition to read: "(iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed 
due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of 
State or local government, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities 
at such facility immediately beforehand." Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986 (SARA), § IOl(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). 
In addition, SARA amended the definition of "owner or operator" by explicitly exempting 
from liability both state and local governments that acquire ownership, title, or control 
involuntarily, for example through bankruptcy or abandonment, and by virtue of their function 
as a sovereign. [d. § 9601(20)(D). Senator Robert Stafford offered the amendment to change 
the definition of "owner or operator" in recognition of the "unique status of governments in 
tenns of their obligation to protect the public, health, welfare and safety, during the course 
of which they acquire ownership or control .... " 131 CONGo REC. S11,619 (daily ed. Sept. 
17, 1985) (statement by Sen. Stafford). For general discussions of the legislative history of 
SARA, see SUPERFUND: THE 1986 AMENDMENTS (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course 
Handbook Series No. 315, 1986); Timothy B. Atkeson et aI., An Annotated Legislative History 
of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,360, 10,360-419 (1986). 
125 CERCLA defines the tenn "facility" to mean 
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any 
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, 
impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or air-
craft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, 
disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any 
consumer product in consumer use or any vessel. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988). 
126 The tenn "vessel", as used in CERCLA, means "every description of watercraft or 
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on 
water." [d. § 9601(28). 
127 [d. § 9607(a)(1}-(2). 
128 [d. § 9601(20)(A); see also District of Columbia v. Franklin Inv. Co., 404 A.2d 536, 540 
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refer to the above quoted language as the "security interest exemp-
tion".129 
Inherent in CERCLA's security interest exemption is the issue of 
lender control liability. Although the term "control" is absent from 
the statutory language and recorded legislative history,130 the ex-
emption provision necessarily relies on a theory of lender control. 
As explained in section II of this Comment, instances of involvement 
and participation by a lender, and even the presence of a security 
interest, are all indicia of lender control. 131 The provision exempts 
from liability those lenders who hold a security interest but do not 
participate in the management of a debtor's facility or vessel. 132 
Thus, the statute explicitly states that the mere existence of a 
security interest does not constitute an indicia of control sufficient 
to impose liability on a lender. 133 
CERCLA, however, is less specific with respect to the potential 
for liability associated with all other indicia of lender control. The 
phrase "participating in the management of a vessel or facility" is 
broad and ambiguous, and the statute leaves it undefined. 134 At most, 
the phrase instructs courts to analyze a lender's involvement in its 
debtor's business activities and, in partiCUlar, in those activities 
associated with the vessel or facility securing the loan. 135 Therefore, 
the basic problem with the security interest exemption is that, not-
withstanding security interests, it does not identify specifically which 
indicia of lender control will trigger CERCLA liability. 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (security interest is insufficient to establish ownership). CERCLA defines 
the term "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, 
joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, 
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988). 
129 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
130 See infra notes 136-62 and accompanying text. 
131 See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text. 
132 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). 
133 See id. In addition to the issue of lender control, courts, commentators, and the EPA 
struggle with the question of whether the security interest exemption applies to a secured 
creditor who at a foreclosure sale purchases property that is subject to its security interest, 
thereby replacing the security interest with an ownership interest. See, e.g., United States 
v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578-80 (D. Md. 1986); In re T.P. Long 
Chern., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 288-89 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 
28,798, 28,805-06, 28,808-09 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300); Joel R. Burcat, 
Foreclosure and United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Paying the Piper or Learning 
How to Dance to a New Tune?, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,098, 10,098-100 (Apr. 
1987); Phillip D. Reed, Fear of Foreclosure: United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 
16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,165, 10,165-69 (July 1986). 
134 See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668,672 (9th Cir. 1990). 
135 See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F.Supp. 556, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1989). 
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The statute's legislative history is sparse and offers only limited 
assistance in the interpretation of the exemption. 136 A bipartisan 
leadership group of senators hastily assembled the bill that became 
CERCLA and, despite opposition from members of the House, 137 
passed the bill in the closing days of an outgoing Congress. l38 Con-
gress considered and passed CERCLA with little time for debate139 
or substantive remarks. 140 
Although the bill that emerged as CERCLA, House bill 7020,141 
generated little legislative history, lawmakers considered several 
other hazardous waste cleanup bills-an examination of these bills, 
such as House bill 85142 and Senate bill 1480,143 offers insight into 
CERCLA's workings. Unfortunately, during consideration of these 
bills, there were few comments regarding the exemption and even 
fewer focusing on the phrase "participating in the management". 144 
House bill 85-the Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act-
was the source of CERCLA's security interest exemption. 145 The 
relevant phrase of the provision reads as follows: "without partici-
pating in the management or operation of a vessel or facility. "146 The 
report that accompanied House bill 85 out of the House Committee 
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries instructed that as long as a fi-
nancing institution does not participate in the management or op-
eration of a facility, it will not be held liable as an owner under the 
136 See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Com'fYl'ehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 
1-2 (1982). See generally SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122. 
137 126 CONGo REC. H11,790-802 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). Representative James Broyhill 
opposed passage of the pending legislation. He expressed concern at the bill's numerous 
defects and technical errors, which were due in great part to inadequate drafting. 1 CERCLA 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 116, at 785; see also Grad, supra note 136, at 33-34. 
188 Grad, supra note 136, at 1. 
139 [d. 
140 See id. at 14-18, 29-35. 
141 H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
142 H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
143 S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
144 See 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122, at 26-36. 
146 See id. at 35-36. House bill 85, as introduced and reported out of the House Committee 
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in May 1979, contained a security interest exemption to 
the term "owner" that is virtually identical to the exemption now present in CERCLA. [d. 
at 35. The exemption in House bill 85 provided that the term "owner . . . does not include a 
person who, without participating in the management or operation of a vessel or facility, holds 
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility . . . ." 
[d. 
146 [d. Following the term management with the phrase "or operation" suggests that if the 
two terms were not interchangeable, then either activity would be sufficient to void the 
exemption. See id. 
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bill. 147 In comparison, House bill 7020-the Hazardous Waste Con-
tainment Act--as introduced, reported out of all committees, and 
passed by the House on September 23, 1980, did not contain any 
provision comparable to the exemption language found in either 
House bill 85 or CERCLA.148 
The Senate counterpart to House bills 85 and 7020, Senate bill 
1480-the Environmental Energy Response Act--was introduced in 
July 1979. 149 The original version of the bill lacked any mention of a 
security interest exemption. 150 As a compromise, Senator Robert 
Stafford submitted an amendment proposing a security interest ex-
emption that would incorporate elements of all three bills. 151 Amend-
ment No. 2622, the Stafford-Randolph Substitute, contains exemp-
tion language identical to that found in CERCLA and similar to the 
language in the House Merchant Marine Committee's version of 
House bill 85. 152 The Senate passed the amendment on November 
24, 1980, and included the security interest exemption in the lan-
guage of Senate bill 1480. 153 
Because revenue legislation must originate in the House of Rep-
resentatives, the Senate turned to House bill 7020. 154 The Senate 
substituted the text of Senate bill 1480 for that of House bill 7020, 
147 H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 36, reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND: A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122, at 35. House bill 85 was referred jointly to the House 
Merchant Marine Committee and the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation. 
Grad, supra note 136, at 3. The bill, as reported out of the House Public Works Committee 
in May 1980, also contained a security interest exemption to the term "owner". 1 SUPERFUND: 
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122, at 34. This version of the bill provided that the 
term 
owner does not include a person who (either directly or through a trust or singly or 
in combination with others) holds title to or any indicia of ownership of a vessel or 
facility and without participating in the management or operation of such vessel or 
facility, leases or charters to any other person (with whom such person is not oth-
erwise affiliated), or holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security 
interest in the vessel or facility . . . . 
Id. The final version of House bill 85 adopted the exemption language that the House Public 
Works Committee proposed. The House passed the bill on September 19, 1980. Id. at 31. 
148 Id. at 30; see also Grad, supra note 136, at 14-18. 
149 Grad, supra note 136, at 6. 
150 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122, at 30. Senate bill 1480 collapsed 
the definitions of the terms "owner" and "operator" into one definition, unlike House bill 85, 
which defined each term separately. See id. 
151 I d. at 26-27. 
162 Compare Amendment No. 2622, § 101(20)(A), reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 122, at 27 with H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(x) (1979) (as 
reported by House Merchant Marine Committee), reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 122, at 35. 
163 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122, at 26. 
154 Grad, supra note 136, at 29. 
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retaining only the bill number and the enacting clause. 155 House bill 
7020 was passed by the Senate on November 24,1980, by the House 
on December 3, 1980,156 and signed by President Carter on December 
11, 1980.157 The final version of the act was in reality Senate bill 
1480, .the bill whose security interest exemption language paralleled 
that of the original version of House bill 85. 
Throughout the drafting of the three bills, legislators commented 
on the role that common law would play in CERCLA's operation. 
During a hearing before the House Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation on House bill 85, Swep Davis, an EPA assistant 
administrator, testified as to the role common law should play with 
respect to the liability of financing institutions. 158 Representative 
James Oberstar noted during the hearing that lenders had testified 
before the committee seeking a specific legislative exemption from 
liability.159 According to Representative Oberstar, the lenders had 
claimed that the common law historically had protected creditors 
from their debtors' liabilities. In order to emphasize their immunity 
from liability, these same lenders had requested that the legislation 
expressly exempt them from liability.160 Mr. Davis noted, and Rep-
resentative Oberstar agreed, that common law principles already 
sufficiently addressed the issue of lender liability, and that the mat-
ter therefore should be left to existing doctrine. 161 On the Senate 
side, Senator Jennings Randolph stated on November 24, 1980, the 
date CERCLA passed the Senate, that "[i]t is intended that issues 
156 [d. 
166 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 122, at 26. 
157 Grad, supra note 136, at 35. 
158 Hearings on Hazardous Chemicals, April 17, 1980: Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and 
Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 270 (1980) (statement of Swep Davis, Assoc. Admin. 
for Water and Waste Management, EPA), reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 122, at 287. 
159 [d. 
160 [d. 
161 [d. Moreover, Mr. Davis remarked that a bank burdened with a heavily mortgaged 
debtor would not hesitate to tell its debtor how to run its business. He felt that "the people 
who are the financial owners still have the ability to influence the operation and to insure that 
that equipment is operated, in fact, in a responsible manner." [d. He concluded this thought 
with the following statement: 
[d. 
So while there is some argument that they [lenders] may not have the same kind 
of responsibility that you have if you are the actual onsite operator of the equipment, 
they certainly have a role in it, and they certainly have some obligation to ensure 
the equipment is operated properly and that the proper insurance or financial re-
sponsibility is obtained by the operators. 
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of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall be governed by 
traditional and evolving principles of common law. "162 
In the end, Congress did not remain silent on the issue of lender 
liability-CERCLA contains a security interest exemption. l63 The 
exemption, however, does not resolve the issue of lender liability. It 
only raises the question of which control activities a lender may 
engage in without exposing itself to CERCLA liability. Congress 
thus left the courts with the task of devising a control analysis 
through which to determine the liability of lenders under CER-
CLA.I64 
IV. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE A 
STANDARD OF LENDER CONTROL LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
A. The Courts' Response to CERCLA's Security Interest 
Exemption 
Several federal courts have examined CERCLA's security interest 
exemption. 165 These courts struggled in interpreting the exemption 
language regarding a lender's participation in the management of a 
vessel or facility. They all, however, acknowledged the need to rely 
on the notion of lender control, either expressly or through language 
synonymous with the term "control".166 The legal theory, as these 
courts have applied it, involves two steps. First, a court scrutinizes 
all indicia of lender control over a debtor.167 Second, the court de-
termines whether the evidence of control is sufficient to impose 
liability. 168 At present, the courts disagree over the degree of control 
that is necessary to incur liability. The division breaks cleanly be-
tween a high and low threshold of liability premised on lender con-
trol.169 
162 126 CONGo REC. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24,1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph, Chairman 
of Committee on Envtl. and Public Works), reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 116, at 686. 
163 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). 
164 See infra notes 165-295 and accompanying text. 
165 See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1550-60 (11th Cir.), reh'g 
denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc), em. denied, III S. Ct. 752 (1991). 
166 See, e.g., id. at 1557-60 (lender involvement); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. 
Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.O. Pa. 1989) (lender control). 
167 See, e.g., United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,996 (E.O. Pa. 1985). 
168 See, e.g., id. at 20,996-97. 
169 See infra notes 170-295 and accompanying text. 
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The courts adhering to a high threshold of liability hold that the 
participation that takes a lender outside the exemption is partici-
pation in the debtor's operational, production, or waste disposal 
activities. 170 The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania in United States v. Mira bile 171 was the first to 
articulate this standard.172 In Mirabile, the issue before the court 
was how far a secured creditor can go in protecting its financial 
interests before the creditor may be characterized as an owner or 
operator under the statute. 173 Focusing primarily on the exemption's 
reference to participation in management, the court distinguished 
between management of the day-to-day operations of a debtor's 
facility and management of the debtor's financial affairs. 174 The court 
concluded that the security interest exemption permits secured cred-
itors to participate actively in the financial aspects of management 
because, according to the court, mere financial ability to control 
hazardous waste disposal practices is not sufficient to impose liabil-
ity.175 In order to fall outside the exemption, a creditor must achieve 
a greater degree of control. 176 The court held that a creditor incurs 
liability when it asserts control over the production or operational 
aspects of the debtor's business. 177 
In formulating its standard of lender liability, the Mirabile court 
adopted a theory of control liability set forth in CERCLA cases 
decided under principles of corporate law. 178 The court cited to three 
decisions that examined the issue of whether an individual involved 
in the management of a corporate disposer of hazardous wastes may 
use the "corporate shield" as protection against liability.179 Each of 
170 Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562; Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995, 20,996; see also In 
re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1990). 
171 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
172 Id. at 20,995. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 See id. at 20,995-96. 
177 Id. at 20,995. As the court noted, U[t]he [exemption's] reference to management of the 
'facility,' as opposed to management of the affairs of the actual owner or operator of the 
facility, suggests ... that the participation which is critical is participation in operational, 
production, or waste disposal activities." Id. Other courts have adopted this standard. See, 
e.g., Coastal Casting Serv., Inc. v. Aron, No. H-86-4463, 1988 WL 35012, at *9-*10 (S.D. 
Tex. 1988). In Aron, for example, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Texas relied on Mirabile for the proposition that a secured creditor must exercise control 
over essential operations of the debtor's facility in order to be held liable under CERCLA. 
Id. 
178 See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995. 
179 Id. (citing New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States 
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these decisions imposed personal liability on corporate officers and 
shareholders who exerted control over both the corporation's finan-
cial and production activities. 180 The Mirabile court, unable to find 
legal precedent regarding lender control liability under CERCLA, 
seized upon this definition of control and extended the application of 
the control concept from the corporate to the secured financing 
context. 181 The court reasoned that a secured creditor, by the nature 
of its relationship with a debtor, automatically asserts the requisite 
financial control. 182 Hence, the court found that once a creditor as-
serts operational control over a facility, the creditor loses the ex-
emption's protection. 183 
In light of this control standard, the Mirabile court reviewed the 
activities of three lending institutions to whom the debtor owed 
money: the American Bank and Trust Company (ABT), Mellon Bank 
National Association (Mellon), and the Small Business Administra-
tion (SBA).I84 These three entities brought the issue of lender lia-
bility before the court on motions for summary judgment. 185 With 
respect to ABT, the court concluded that a secured creditor may 
pursue foreclosure, as well as those activities associated with fore-
closure, and still remain within the exemption so long as the sole 
purpose of the lending institution's efforts is to protect its security 
interest. l86 ABT foreclosed on the debtor's property after the debt-
or's operations had ceased, and made no effort to continue the debt-
or's operations. It protected the property against vandalism and 
showed the property to prospective purchasers. 187 According to the 
v. Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. N.E. 
Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, in part, and rev'd, in 
part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
ISO See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052--53; Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,700; N.E. 
Pharmaceutical & Chem Co., 579 F. Supp. at 847-49. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit noted in United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 
726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987), that although the corporate officer 
disregarded corporate formalities, the personal liability imposed on the officer was "distinct 
from the derivative liability that results from 'piercing the corporate veil.'" [d. at 744. Using 
what would be labeled a functional approach, the court noted that "[ilt is the authority to 
control the handling and disposal of hazardous substances that is critical under the statutory 
scheme." [d. at 743. Hence, the court held the officer liable because he participated in conduct 
that violates CERCLA. [d. at 744. 
181 See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995. 
182 See id. 
183 [d. The Mirabile court implied that its interpretation of the exemption would further 
CERCLA's goals because application of its analysis would impose liability on lenders who 
were responsible for or profited from improper disposal practices. [d. at 20,996. 
184 [d. at 20,995. 
185 [d. 
186 [d. at 20,996. 
187 [d. 
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court, ABT's activities at the property following foreclosure were 
limited to those steps necessary to protect its security interest and 
did not constitute participation in the operational management of 
the facility.l88 The court thus held that ABT was entitled to the 
protection of the security interest exemption. 189 
Likewise, the Mirabile court held that the SBA did not participate 
in the management of the facility in such a way as to incur liability. 190 
Unlike ABT, the SBA did not move to foreclose on its security 
interest. The SBA's loan agreement contemplated participation by 
the lender in the day-to-day management of the debtor's business, 
but the SBA did not exercise this authority.191 The Mirabile court 
implied that the mere existence of creditor authority to assert control 
over management practices is not alone sufficient to hold the lender 
liable. l92 To be held liable, the court suggested, a lender must act on 
its authority and actually participate in the facility's management. l93 
The loan agreement also provided for restrictions on the debtor's 
use of the loan proceeds. 194 Although the SBA imposed these restric-
tions, the court found that this conduct was merely evidence of 
lender participation of a purely financial nature. 195 Moreover, the 
court noted that although the restrictions limited the flow of money 
to the debtor's principals, the restrictions did not affect the funding 
of disposal activities. 1OO As noted above, under the Mirabile stan-
dard, participation in the debtor's financial activities does not nec-
essarily take the creditor outside of the security interest exemp-
tion. 197 
The court did not grant summary judgment with respect to Mel-
lon. l98 The court believed that Mellon's predecessor-in-interest, the 
Girard Bank, might have been involved deeply in the day-to-day 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 20,997. 
191 Id. 
192 See id. 
IllS See id.; accOTd In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990) (court 
explicitly noted that "there must be some actual management of the facility before a secured 
creditor" is no longer eligible for exemption). 
1M Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997. 
1116 Id. In Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania expanded upon the notion of a "safe harbor" for lenders 
from CERCLA liability. 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Pa. 1989); see also Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 
672 (lenders must be permitted to act to protect security interests without triggering CER-
CLA liability; without safe harbor, security interest exemption ceases to have meaning). 
196 Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997. 
19'1 Id. at 20,996. 
198 Id. at 20,997. 
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operations of the debtor. 199 A deposition of the debtor's management 
consultant noted the following activities of the secured creditor: 
frequent visits to the site, requests for manufacturing changes and 
reassignment of personnel, demands for additional sales efforts, and 
a statement informing the debtor that it must accept the day-to-day 
supervision of a representative of the Girard Bank if it wished to 
continue to operate with Girard funds.200 According to the Mirabile 
court, this level of lender involvement in the operational manage-
ment of the business created the possibility that Mellon would not 
be able to benefit from the security interest exemption. 201 
Like the Mirabile court, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania in Guidice v. BFG Electroplating 
& Manufacturing CO.202 adopted a control standard that requires a 
strong showing of lender participation in the operational aspects of 
the debtor's business.203 In Guidice, the residents of the Borough of 
Punxsutawney, a Pennsylvania community,204 brought suit against 
the BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Company (BFG) alleging 
that the defendant had contaminated the borough's sewage treat-
ment plant with discharges of cyanide and heavy metal particles in 
excess of borough ordinance limits.205 The plaintiffs demanded reim-
bursement for CERCLA response costS.206 BFG, in turn, sought 
indemnification, contribution, and response costs from current and 
past owners of a property adjacent to its facility.207 The adjacent 
property was the site of a metal polishing company known as the 
Berlin Metal Polishers.208 Samples taken at the Berlin Metal facility 
revealed that its operations had contributed to the discharge of 
hazardous materials.209 The National Bank of the Commonwealth 
was a former mortgagee of the adjacent property, as well as a past 
record title owner of the property.210 Therefore, BFG filed a third-
party complaint against the bank, among others. 211 
199 [d. 
200 [d. 
201 [d. 
202 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989). 
208 [d. at 562. 
204 The Borough of Punxsutawney is the home of the famous groundhog who, if it sees its 
shadow, will return to its den, indicating that more winter weather is sure to follow. 
206 Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 557-59. 
206 [d. at 557. 
207 [d. 
208 [d. at 558. 
l!O9 [d. at 558-59. 
210 [d. at 557-59. 
211 [d. at 557. 
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Being a secured creditor of the Berlin Metal facility, the bank 
attempted to invoke the protection of the CERCLA security interest 
exemption. 212 The Guidice court bifurcated its analysis of the bank's 
activities between the time period prior to the bank's foreclosure 
and purchase of the facility at the foreclosure sale, and that time 
during which the bank was record owner of the property.213 The 
court focused on the issue of the lender's participation in the defen-
dant's management only in the first segment of its analysis. 214 The 
court followed the Mirabile court's high liability threshold requiring 
day-to-day control of the facility and likewise found support for its 
liability standard in a corporate law control analysis. 215 The Guidice 
court, however, broadened the range of acceptable creditor activities 
from mere financial involvement to those measures that the court 
characterized as "prudent" in light of the need to protect a security 
interest. 216 The Guidice court's analysis suggested that a secured 
creditor may participate in the financial management of a debtor's 
business and even become involved tangentially in the management 
of the debtor's operations without falling outside of the exemption.217 
Prior to default, the bank in Guidice had extended additional funds 
to Berlin Metal and received periodic financial statements. 218 After 
default, the bank met with the debtor to learn of the status of its 
accounts, personnel changes, and the presence of raw materials. 219 
In addition, the bank actively assisted Berlin Metal in its pursuit of 
a loan from the SBA and initiated communications with the borough 
in order to bring the debtor into compliance with the discharge 
212 [d. at 561. 
213 [d. Because the latter segment of the court's analysis only addressed the issue of liability 
premised on the bank's status as title holder, discussion of this portion of the analysis is not 
within the scope of this Comment. See id. at 562-63. 
214 [d. at 561-62. 
215 See id. at 562. The Guidice court noted the standard of liability set forth in Mirabile. 
[d. at 561. Moreover, like the Mirabile court, the court in Guidice referred to a corporate law 
case in which a court relied_ on the concept of control in order to impose CERCLA liability. 
[d. at 562 (discussing Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986». In Bunker 
Hill, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho held a parent corporation 
liable for the cleanup costs associated with its subsidiary. 635 F. Supp. at 672. The court found 
that the parent controlled the management and operations of its subsidiary and therefore was 
an owner or operator under the statute. [d. The court took care to recognize that certain 
activities of a parent with respect to its subsidiary are normal and shOUld not automatically 
incur liability. [d. The court, however, refused to cloak these activities with immunity on the 
grounds that to do so might frustrate CERCLA's purposes. [d. 
216 See Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562. 
217 See id. 
218 [d. 
219 [d. 
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ordinance. 22o The Guidice court found these activities to be insuffi-
cient to cause the lender to lose the protection of the security interest 
exemption.221 The court labeled the bank's actions as necessary to 
protect its security interest in the property.222 Furthermore, the 
court found no evidence to suggest that the bank controlled the 
debtor's operational, production, or waste disposal activities. 223 
In In re Bergsoe Metal COrp.,224 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit confronted the security interest exemp-
tion but declined to establish a rule on the statutory language re-
garding lender participation in management.225 Nevertheless, the 
court's decision provides insight into the exemption's parameters. 
Like the Mirabile and Guidice courts, the court in Bergsoe embraced 
a high liability threshold. It held that a lender must actually exercise 
control over management of a facility before it can be held liable 
under CERCLA.226 Thus, the court determined that mere authority 
to exercise control is not sufficient to incur liability.227 Indeed, the 
court stated that the exemption does not equate management with 
a secured creditor's power to manage or to become involved in 
management. 228 
In Bergsoe, the debtor, a lead recycling plant, owed money on 
bonds issued by the Port of St. Helens, a municipal corporation 
empowered to issue revenue bonds.229 The Port had provided the 
debtor with funds, acquired through the sale of the bonds, to pur-
chase land and build its facility. To secure the debt, the Port and 
the debtor entered into sale-and-Iease-back agreements that trans-
220 [d. Under the EPA's proposed rule on lender liability, secured creditors would be held 
responsible for cleanup costs if they exercised decisionmaking control, or control at the 
management level, over the debtor's environmental compliance responsibilities. Proposed 
Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,803 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). In Guidice, the 
bank exerted a small degree of control over compliance efforts when it initiated communica-
tions with the borough. 732 F. Supp. at 562. Under the proposed rule, however, it is likely 
that this level of involvement would not be sufficient to trigger liability. See Proposed Rule, 
54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,803 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 300). In fact, the rule 
permits lenders to demand that their debtors comply with environmental laws and regulations. 
[d. at 28,800. Lender assistance to initiate compliance efforts does not rise to the level of 
control and therefore likely also would be considered a protected activity. See id. at 28,803. 
221 [d. 
222 [d. 
223 [d. 
224 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). 
225 [d. at 672. 
226 [d. at 672-73. 
227 [d. 
228 [d. at 673 n.3. 
229 [d. at 669-70. 
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felTed title to the debtor's real property and facility to the Port. 230 
The Port acquired certain rights under the leases, such as the right 
to inspect the premises and to reenter the premises in order to take 
possession of its property.2:H The Port never exercised these 
rights.232 The Bergsoe court held that because it is not the existence 
but the exercise of such rights that raises the issue of participation 
under CERCLA, the Port did not participate in management and 
therefore was entitled to the protection of CERCLA's security in-
terest exemption. 233 
Furthermore, as in G1I1'dice, the court in Bergsoe acknowledged 
that certain indicia of control are necessary to protect a lender's 
interests and, moreover, are common to most credit transactions. 234 
In addition to the rights under the leases, the Port encouraged the 
creation of the Bergsoe facility.235 The court concluded that the Port's 
rights under the leases and its involvement during the initial stages 
of the project were reasonable to ensure repayment of its bonds.236 
Thus, according to the Bergsoe court, standard lender participation 
that is necessary to protect a security interest and is typical to the 
debtor-creditor relationship cannot be characterized as management 
and does not itself violate the exemption. 237 
Unlike Mirabile and Guidice, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit established a low liability threshold for 
230 [d. Under a sale-and-lease-back arrangement, the debtor sells property to a lender, 
thereby transferring the fee simple title to the lender. Sidney A. Keyles, Sale-Leaseback 
Financing, in 2 MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 755,757,758 (ALI-ABA Comm. on 
Continuing Professional Education ed., 1983). The lender in turn leases the property back to 
the debtor who retains title to the improvements on the leasehold interest. [d. at 757. The 
debtor enjoys use and possession of the property while making payments under the lease. See 
id. The court in Bergsoe acknowledged that the sale-and-lease-back agreement was not the 
typical security transaction, and noted the absence of a security agreement. See 910 F.2d at 
671. The court, however, recognized that the sole purpose of the arrangement was to provide 
financing for the facility. [d. Indeed, the "rent" payments were equal to the principal and 
interest payments on the bonds, and the lease expired when the bonds were paid off. [d. In 
addition, the lease transferred traditional indicia of ownership to the debtor, such as the duty 
to pay taxes, maintain insurance, and absorb the risk of loss from damage. [d. Thus, the court 
concluded that the Port held title for no other reason than to protect a security interest in 
the facility, and that, therefore, the arrangement was in the nature of a secured financing 
transaction. [d. at 671-72. 
281 910 F.2d at 672. 
232 [d. at 673. 
233 [d. at 672-73. 
234 [d. 
236 [d. at 672. 
2S6 [d. at 672-73. 
287 See id. 
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lenders in United States v. Fleet Factors COrp.238 The Fleet Factors 
court expressly rejected the Mirabile standard and held that a lender 
who exerts control over either the operational or the financial man-
agement of the facility to an extent indicating a capacity to affect 
hazardous waste disposal practices may be held liable under CER-
CLA.239 
In Fleet Factors, the EPA brought an action against a bankrupt 
debtor's officers and the Fleet Factors Corporation, the debtor's 
creditor, to recover costs for the removal of hazardous chemicals and 
asbestos from the debtor's facility.240 The debtor, Swainsboro Print 
Works, Inc. (SPW), operated a cloth printing facility on its premises 
from 1963 until February 1981.241 In 1976, Fleet and SPW entered 
into a factoring agreement242 whereby Fleet agreed to advance funds 
against the assignment of SPW's accounts receivable.243 In addition, 
Fleet obtained a security interest in SPW's equipment, inventory, 
fixtures, and facility.244 The financing arrangement continued until 
early 1981,245 when Fleet advised SPW that its account was over-
extended, and that Fleet no longer would finance SPW's opera-
tions. 246 On February 27, 1981, SPW ceased operations at its facil-
ity.247 
In May 1982, Fleet foreclosed on SPW's inventory and equip-
ment.248 Fleet hired Baldwin Industrial Liquidators, Inc. to conduct 
an auction and sale of Fleet's collateral. Some of the collateral was 
sold at public auction and removed from SPW's premises by the 
238 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc), eert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). 
239 Id. at 1557--58. 
240 I d. at 1552--53. 
241 United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aiI'd, 
remanded, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990). 
242 A factoring agreement is regarded as a financing arrangement although, in form, the 
transaction is an outright sale of the "debtor's" accounts receivables to the "lender" without 
recourse against the debtor. 1 GILMORE, supra note 49, § 5.1, at 128 n.3. In a typical textile 
factoring agreement, the lender exercises considerable control over the debtor's affairs. Id. 
§ 5.4, at 136. 
243 Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 957. 
244 Id. 
245 In August 1979, SPW filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 1l of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Id. Fleet, however, with court approval, continued to finance SPW on 
similar terms. Id. In December 1981, the bankruptcy court entered an order converting the 
debtor's Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding to a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7. 
Id. at 958. 
246 Id. at 958. 
247 Id. at 957. 
248 Id. at 958. Fleet foreclosed on the security interests in some of its collateral, but only 
after obtaining bankruptcy court approval. Id. 
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purchasers. 249 After the auction, Fleet contracted with Nix Riggers 
to remove the remaining equipment from SPW's facility and leave 
SPW's premises in "broom clean" condition.25O Nix left the facility in 
December 1983.251 
The EPA subsequently sued Fleet, and each party moved for 
summary judgment on the issue of Fleet's entitlement to the pro-
tection of the CERCLA security interest exemption.252 The EPA 
contended that the removal of equipment by the purchasers at the 
auction and Nix caused friable asbestos to come loose from pipes 
attached to the equipment. 253 Moreover, the EPA asserted that in 
preparation for the auction, Baldwin moved leaking and rusting 
drums containing hazardous dyes and chemicals and therefore con-
tributed to the release of environmental contaminants. 254 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Georgia found that Fleet's activities prior to Baldwin's auction prep-
arations did not rise to a level of participation in the management of 
the SPW facility sufficient to impose liability on Fleet.255 The court 
adhered to the Mirabile standard, under which a secured creditor 
may become involved in the financial management of a debtor with-
out incurring CERCLA liability.256 The district court's interpretation 
of the Mirabile standard even allowed isolated instances of lender 
control provided the creditor did not participate in day-to-day man-
agement of the facility either before or after the business ceased 
operations.257 The district court found, however, that Fleet's activi-
ties during the period of Baldwin's and Nix's involvement potentially 
could bring the lender outside of the exemption. 258 The court there-
fore denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. 259 
Fleet brought an interlocutory appeal from the district court's 
denial of its summary judgment motion.260 The United States Court 
2<9 Id. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 955, 957. The parties disagreed as to the events surrounding the auction and the 
subsequent cleanup activities inside the facility. Id. at 958. 
253 I d. at 958. 
264 Id. Fleet disputed the presence of asbestos on the pipes. Id. In the alternative, Fleet 
contended that if there was any improper disposal of hazardous substances, it occurred prior 
to Fleet's foreclosure and sale of SPW's inventory and equipment. Id. 
266 Id. at 960. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
258 See id. at 960-6l. 
258 Id. at 96l. 
2:60 United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 911 
F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc), em. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). 
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of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court 
that material questions of fact remained regarding the extent of 
Fleet's participation in the management of the SPW facility, and 
affirmed the district court's denial of Fleet's summary judgment 
motion. 261 The court of appeals noted, however, that the district 
court's construction of the security interest exemption was too broad 
and proceeded to formulate its own standard of lender liability. 262 
The court of appeals in Fleet Factors rejected a literal interpre-
tation of the CERCLA security interest exemption that would deny 
protection to secured creditors who in any way or manner partici-
pated in the management of their debtors' facilities. 263 According to 
the court, this standard fails to acknowledge the normal course of 
dealing between secured creditors and debtors, which necessarily 
includes some involvement by creditors in their debtors' financial 
affairs. 264 
The court of appeals in Fleet Factors also rejected the broad 
construction of the phrase "participating in the management" that 
the Mirabile court had formulated. 265 The Fleet Factors court found 
that the Mirabile court's interpretation of the exemption essentially 
requires a secured lender to become an operator of a facility in order 
for liability to attach to the lender. 266 The court noted that such a 
construction would be repetitive in that persons who operate facili-
ties already are potentially liable as operators under the express 
language of CERCLA section 107(a)(2).267 The court therefore re-
jected an interpretation of the exemption that would equate lenders 
with operators. 268 
261 Id. 
262 See id. at 1557. The court of appeals set forth a new interpretation of the exemption 
under which, nevertheless, issues of fact remained as to whether Fleet's level of participation 
in the management of the facility was sufficient to incur liability under CERCLA. Id. at 1557-
60. 
263 I d. at 1556. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 1558; see supra notes 171-83 and accompanying text. 
266 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557--58. 
267 Id. at 1557; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)(1988) (operator liability under CERCLA). 
26B Id. at 1557--58. The court found additional support for its rejection of a broad construction 
of the exemption in Representative William Harsha's comments to Congress regarding the 
security interest exemption. Id. at 1558 n.11. Representative Harsha noted that the exemption 
was "necessary because the original definition [of 'owner'] inadvertently subjected those who 
hold title to a vessel or facility, but do not participate in the management or operation and 
are not otherwise affiliated with the person leasing or operating the vessel or facility, to the 
liability provisions of the bill." 2 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 116, at 945. 
The Fleet Factors court reasoned that the term "affiliated" indicates a more peripheral 
involvement with the debtor's facility than that which an operator would undertake. 901 F.2d 
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Moreover, the Fleet Factors court reasoned that the Mirabile 
standard was too lenient toward creditors.269 Noting the remedial 
nature of CERCLA, the court construed the exemption so as to 
favor liability.270 The court formulated a low liability threshold 
whereby a lender, without exerting hands-on control over its debt-
or's operations, would incur CERCLA liability by participating in 
the financial management of the debtor to an extent suggesting a 
degree of control over the facility's disposal practices.271 Unlike the 
Mirabile standard, participation in the day-to-day operations of a 
facility or in management decisions relating to the treatment of 
hazardous wastes would not be prerequisites for a court to impose 
liability.272 The court in Fleet Factors concluded that the increased 
potential for liability would cause creditors to monitor their debtors' 
activities for compliance with disposal standards and thereby further 
Congress's goal of encouraging safer hazardous waste disposal pro-
cedures. 273 
The court of appeals in Fleet Factors agreed with the district court 
that Fleet was entitled to claim the CERCLA security interest 
exemption for the period prior to the date when SPW ceased its 
operations.274 During this period, Fleet advanced funds to SPW, paid 
and arranged for utility services .to the facility, and denied financing 
when SPW overextended its account.275 With respect to the period 
after SPW ceased printing operations and before Fleet contracted 
with Baldwin, the court of appeals noted that Fleet's participation 
at 1558 n.ll. The court concluded that the liability threshold for a secured creditor must be 
lower than the liability threshold of an operator, thereby further justifying its narrow con-
struction of the security interest exemption. [d. 
The Fleet Factors court's reasoning, however, ignores the remainder of Representative 
Harsha's comments. The congressman noted that the purpose of the exemption was "to truly 
exempt those who hold title but do not participate in the operation or management activities." 
2 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 116, at 945. Congress did not intend the 
phrase "affiliated with" to refer to secured creditors, but to those who lease or charter a 
vessel or facility. This language was included in the exemption "to prevent the establishment 
of 'dummy' corporations, with few assets, which would be the responsible party for the purpose 
of the act." [d. The Fleet Factors court's reliance on the phrase "affiliated with" therefore 
was misplaced. 
269 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. 
270 [d. 
271 [d. The court provided that "[a] secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with 
the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect 
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose." [d. at 1558. 
272 [d. at 1557-58. 
2'l3 See id. at 1558. 
274 [d. at 1559. 
275 [d. 
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in the management of the facility may have been sufficient to cause 
the lender to lose the exemption's protection.276 The court listed a 
number of activities that could trigger liability. Fleet, for example, 
required SPW to seek Fleet's approval before shipping goods to 
customers, and determined when and to whom finished goods would 
be shipped.277 In addition, Fleet set the price for excess inventory, 
determined when SPW should let employees go, received and pro-
cessed the debtor's employment and tax forms, and controlled access 
to the facility.278 During the post-default period, Fleet exercised 
nearly complete control over the financial management of the facility 
and exerted some control over operations. The court concluded that, 
under its construction of the exemption, the EPA demonstrated facts 
sufficient to support the inference that Fleet could have influenced 
waste disposal decisions. 279 
Lastly, both the district court and the court of appeals agreed that 
Fleet's involvement with the facility from the time Baldwin was 
hired until Nix left the premises could be sufficient to impose liabil-
ity.28O Fleet argued that it merely engaged in a foreclosure and sale 
of the debtor's inventory and equipment.281 The court of appeals 
rejected this argument and found that it was unimportant that Fleet 
might have taken these steps to protect its security interest. 282 
According to the court of appeals, the relevant inquiry under the 
security interest exemption is not a creditor's intent or motive but 
the nature and extent of the creditor's involvement with the facil-
ity.283 
A summary of the federal judicial holdings on the issue of partic-
ipation in management reveals two discrete approaches to lender 
liability. The Mirabile standard permits lender control of a debtor's 
financial management but imposes liability on lenders who exercise 
control over the day-to-day operations of a debtor's facility.284 The 
276 [d. Using the Mirabile standard, the district court arrived at the opposite conclusion-
a finding that the court of appeals described as erroneous. [d. 
277 [d. 
278 [d. 
279 [d. 
280 [d. at 1559-60. 
281 [d. at 1560. 
282 [d. 
288 [d. In fact, the court of appeals regarded Fleet's activities during this third time period 
as sufficient not only to void the exemption but to incur liability as an operator of the facility. 
[d. 
284 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
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Fleet Factors standard disregards the distinction between opera-
tional and financial management and imposes liability on a lender 
whose general involvement with a debtor's facility enables the lender 
to control waste disposal decisions should it so chose. 285 
Two other decisions refined the lender control analyses set forth 
in Mirabile and Fleet Factors. The Guidice court adopted the Mir-
abile standard but expanded the gamut of acceptable lender activi-
ties to allow particular instances of lender involvement in the debt-
or's operations.286 The Guidice court limited this involvement to that 
degree necessary to protect a lender's interests. 287 The Bergsoe court 
declined to formulate a rule on the issue of lender control liability 
under CERCLA288 but nevertheless modified both the Mirabile and 
Fleet Factors standards. The Bergsoe standard requires indicia of 
actual control, not just mere authority to exercise control, in order 
for a lender to fall outside of the exemption.289 Moreover, Bergsoe 
reinforced the Guidice extension of acceptable lender activity to 
include lender involvement that is both necessary to protect a se-
curity interest and common to secured financing transactions. 290 
A potential for conflict exists between the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits. As noted above, the Fleet Factors rule does not distinguish 
between operational and financial management of a facility.291 More-
over, Fleet Factors' low liability threshold does not protect any 
indicia of lender involvement.292 On the other hand, the court in 
Bergsoe acknowledged that because lenders must protect their in-
terests, a certain degree of control and involvement is present in all 
debtor-creditor relationships.293 The Bergsoe court refused to char-
acterize these indicia of control as management.294 It provided the 
protection of the security interest exemption to what it determined 
were necessary lender activities, thereby establishing a higher 
285 901 F.2d at 1557 (court of appeals' standard of lender liability). 
286 See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561-62 (W.D. Pa. 
1989). 
287 Id. 
288 In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668,672 (9th Cir. 1990). 
289 Id. at 673 n.3. 
290 See id. at 672-73. 
291 United States v. Fleet Factor Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 911 
F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990) (en bane), eert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991); see S1tp1'a notes 238-
39,271-72 and accompanying text. 
292 See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557-58. The court recognized that a lender will exhibit 
some degree of involvement with its debtor due to the nature of a credit transaction. The 
court's final analysis, however, does not protect this degree of lender participation. Id. 
293 See 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990). 
294 See id. 
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threshold of liability than that set forth in Fleet Factors. Hence, 
once the Ninth Circuit establishes a rule on lender liability under 
CERCLA, it appears that there will be disagreement among the 
federal courts of appeals on their formulations of the CERCLA 
security interest exemption. 295 
B. The EPA's Proposed Interpretive Rule on the CERCLA 
Security Interest Exemption 
In response to the courts' varied interpretations of the CERCLA 
security interest exemption296 and the legitimate concerns of both 
private and federal lending institutions,297 the EPA proposed a rule 
interpreting the exemption.298 The proposed rule acknowledges the 
295 In its brief to the Supreme Court requesting a grant of certiorari, Fleet noted a different 
conflict between the two courts' approaches. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit at 5-8, United States v. Fleet Factors 
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (No. 90-504). Fleet asserted that the Fleet Factors 
court's language regarding capacity to control waste disposal decisions does not require the 
exercise of that control. Id. at 6. Thus, Fleet argued that the result in Fleet Factors is 
inconsistent with the Bergsoe rule requiring the lender to actually exercise its authority to 
participate in management. Id. These comments misread the cases. Both Bergsoe and Fleet 
Factors required actual lender involvement in the management of the facility. Bergsoe, 910 
F.2d at 672; Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558. The language in Fleet Factors regarding an 
authority to control refers only to the treatment of hazardous wastes, not to general manage-
ment practices. 901 F.2d at 1558. Both Bergsoe and Fleet Factors suggest that once a plaintiff 
shows that a lender exercised actual control over management, the lender's involvement may 
be sufficient to establish that the lender had the ability to affect disposal decisions. Id.; Bergsoe, 
910 F.2d at 673 n.3. Regardless of whether a lender acts pursuant to this authority, both 
courts hold that this capacity to control waste disposal decisions is sufficient to incur liability. 
296 See supra notes 165-295 and accompanying text. 
297 See U.S. Asks Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 1583. 
298 Proposed Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,798-99 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
300) (proposed June 5, 1991). For the text of the first draft of EPA's proposed rule, see EPA 
Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues Under the Secured Creditor Exemption of 
CERCLA, 21 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1162, 1162-67 (Oct. 12, 1990). For 
the text of the second draft of the rule, see Proposed Draft Rule on Lender Liability Under 
CERCLA with Accompanying Letter from EPA to OMB, 21 [Current Developments] Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1908, 1909-22 (Feb. 22, 1991). 
The EPA has received over 350 comments on the proposed rule. Lender Liability Singled 
Out for Fast Track, Not Delay, Under 90-Day Rule-Making Moratorium, 22 [Current De-
velopments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 2330, 2330 (Feb. 7, 1992) [hereinafter Fast Track]. The rule's 
critics contend the following: that the rule does not clarify, but instead expands, the exemption; 
that the rule grants almost absolute immunity to foreclosure and liquidation activities; that 
the rule exempts those lenders who actually cause or contribute to the release of a hazardous 
substance; that the rule no longer requires lenders to conduct environmental audits before 
making loans; and that the rule improperly shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff in cases 
where the defendant invokes the security interest exemption. Sweetheart Deal, supra note 6, 
at 1159. Supporters of the rule have commented that the EPA should provide retroactive 
relief to lenders; that the rule should exempt trustees and other fiduciaries; that the rule does 
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needs of secured creditors to manage, oversee, or otherwise act to 
protect a security interest. 299 It also, however, recognizes the EPA's 
duty to recover public funds spent in cleaning up hazardous waste 
sites.3°O The EPA's administrative solution seeks to reconcile these 
two competing interests. 301 
Lenders assert certain contractual rights and engage in certain 
activities in the normal course of dealing with a debtor.302 Secured 
creditors must undertake these activities in order to protect their 
security interests and manage properly their loan portfolios. 303 Re-
flecting the concerns of the Guidice304 and Bergsoe305 courts, the 
proposed rule seeks to protect such activities under the security 
interest exemption. 306 The rule identifies a broad range of permis-
not protect lenders from liability in private party lawsuits; and that the rule does not specify 
when or even if lenders must take preventative or mitigative steps with regard to environ-
mentally harmful substances. Id. 
The EPA is in the last stages of responding to comments and drafting the final rule. Fast 
Track, supra, at 2330. In order to speed up promulgation, President George Bush placed the 
rule on the White House "fast track". Id. Despite the 90-day moratorium on new regulations, 
the administration has singled out rules that will promote economic growth and established a 
procedure to hurry their adoption. Id. The lender liability rule is likely to ease the credit 
crunch and therefore has qualified for placement on the fast track. Id. 
In addition to the agency's actions, Congress also has attempted to resolve the confusion 
surrounding CERCLA's security interest exemption. Its endeavors, however, have been less 
than successful. The Senate addressed the issue of lender control liability under CERCLA in 
its bank-reform legislation-Senate bill 543. Lender Liability Limits in Bank Bill Cause 
Concern as EPA Prepares Final Rule, 22 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1344, 
1344 (Sept. 20, 1991). The Senate incorporated into the bill lender liability legislation intro-
duced earlier in the session by Senator Jake Garn. Id.; see also S. 651, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1991) (lender held liable if it causes or contributes to, or actively directs or conducts operations 
that result in, release of hazardous substance). The final version of Senate bill 543, however, 
as passed by the Senate on November 21, 1991, did not contain the lender liability language. 
Senate-Passed Lender Liability Provisions Would Have Amended CERCLA to Protect Bank-
ers, 22 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1819, 1819 (Nov. 22, 1991); see also S. 543, 
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Rep. 
LaFalce) (defines "participating in the management" to mean "the actual, direct, and continual 
or recurrent exercise of managerial control by a person over the vessel or facility in which he 
or she holds a security interest, which managerial control materially divests the borrower, 
debtor, or obligor of such control"). 
299 Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,800, 28,802-06 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 300). 
300 Id. at 28,800. 
301 Id. 
302 See supra notes 27-59 and accompanying text. 
303 See Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,800 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
300); see also supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text. 
304 See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561-62 (W.D. Pa. 
1989). 
30Ii See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990). 
306 Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,800 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
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sible lender activities, including actions taken at the inception of a 
loan or other transaction giving rise to a security interest, actions 
to police the loan or security interest, loan workout, and actions 
during foreclosure and liquidation. 307 The rule does not treat these 
types of lender involvement--ordinary and customary loan manage-
ment practices-as evidence of participation in the management. 308 
The proposed EPA rule instructs that a lender falls outside the 
scope of the exemption if it actually participates in the management 
or operations of the debtor's facility.309 The rule requires, however, 
that there be a nexus between lender control over facility operations 
and lender control over the hazardous substances present at the 
facility.310 The rule provides that a secured creditor will be deemed 
to have participated in the management of a facility if it either: 
(1) exercis[es] decisionmaking control over the borrower's en-
vironmental compliance, such that the security holder has under-
taken responsibility for the borrower's waste disposal or hazard-
ous substance handling practices which results in a release or 
threatened release; or 
(2) exercis[es] control at a management level encompassing 
the borrower's environmental compliance responsibilities, com-
parable to that of a manager of the borrower's enterprise, such 
that the security holder has assumed or manifested responsibility 
for the management of the enterprise by establishing, imple-
menting, or maintaining the policies and procedures encompas-
sing the day-to-day environmental compliance decisionmaking of 
the enterprise. 311 
Lenders, however, may conduct environmental inspections, re-
quest assurances of compliance with environmental laws, and even 
require debtors to clean up their facilities without losing the exemp-
tion's protection.312 The proposed rule notes that activities such as 
these may be necessary to determine the risk associated with a loan 
307 [d. at 28,800, 28,802--05, 28,808-09. 
308 [d. at 28,803. 
309 [d. at 28,802--03, 28,809. 
310 See id. at 28,803, 28,809. 
311 [d. at 28,809. 
312 [d. at 28,800, 28,803-04. In addition, liability cannot be premised on the inclusion of 
environmental warranties and covenants in the loan documents. [d. at 28,804. 
During a foreclosure and liquidation, a lender may take steps to prevent or minimize the 
risk of a release of hazardous substances. See id. at 28,805. The rule recognizes that the lender 
is taking such mitigative or preventative measures to preserve the value of its collateral and 
thus to protect its security interest. [d. The rule therefore does not treat these activities as 
participation in the management. [d.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d) (1988) (CERCLA precludes 
liability "for costs or damages as a result of actions taken or omitted in the course of rendering 
care, assistance, or advice"). 
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or adequately to police a loan.313 Thus, the rule's characterization of 
these activities as permissible is consistent with the EPA's desire to 
shield lending activities that are basic to protecting a security inter-
est.314 Nonetheless, the rule cautions that although a lender may not 
have participated in the management of a facility under the standard 
set forth in the rule, a lender still may be held independently liable 
if it is itself responsible for the release of a hazardous substance.315 
Application of the security interest exemption requires courts to 
conduct a fact-sensitive inquiry to determine whether a secured 
creditor has participated in the management of a facility sufficiently 
to "void the exemption". 316 The EPA proposed its interpretive rule 
to provide courts with a workable definition of certain statutory 
elements in CERCLA's security interest exemption, such as the 
phrase "participating in the management".317 Once finalized, the rule 
most likely will govern EPA suits against lenders. 318 At present, 
however, the proposed rule is silent with regard to private party 
actions. 319 Thus, it is unclear whether courts will apply the rule when 
a private litigant is suing a secured creditor or, instead, substitute 
their own interpretations of the exemption for that of the agency. 320 
313 Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,800 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
314 See id. 
315 Id. at 28,804. 
316 Id. at 28,802. 
317 Id. at 28,798, 28,799. 
318 See id. at 28,799; accord American Bar Association Meeting, supra note 8, at 1149; 
EPA Proposes Rules to Ease Burden on Secured Lenders for Superfund Liability, SECURED 
LENDING ALERT, Oct. 1990, at 2, 4 [hereinafter Rules to Ease Burden); see also Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1984) (courts 
should give deference to administrative interpretations of statutory scheme that Congress has 
entnlsted agency to administer). 
319 See Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,798-810 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 300). 
320 Rules to Ease Burden, s'upra note 318, at 4; Sweetheart Deal, supra note 6, at 1162. 
The American Bar Association (ABA) has suggested that perhaps the EPA included the 
proposed nile under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) "to try to make the regulation 
applicable to private cost recovery litigation." Sweetheart Deal, supra note 6, at 1162. The 
ABA is uncertain, however, whether inclusion in the NCP will be sufficient to broaden 
application of the nile to private party actions against lenders. 
There exist two additional reasons to doubt the utility of the nile in private party suits. 
First, the EPA's nile would amount to an about-face for the agency on the interpretation of 
the security interest exemption. Rules to Ease B'urden, supra note 318, at 4. A majority of 
courts have held that deference will depend on the consisten~y with which the EPA has 
adhered to the position set forth in the regulation that is currently under sCnltiny. See, e.g., 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 & n.30 (1987) (court rejected Board of Immigration 
Appeals's (BIA) interpretation of two statutory provisions because BIA on three previous 
842 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:805 
This uncertainty concerns lenders,321 especially because commenta-
tors now warn that if the rule impairs the government's ability to 
recover costs from lenders, then lenders will be subject to an in-
creased number of third-party actions by parties that the govern-
ment targets for recovery of its costs. 322 
V. CRITICISMS AND COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF 
LENDER CONTROL LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
To varying degrees, both the courts and the EPA take note of 
CERCLA's regulatory objective-to deter the improper treatment 
and disposal of hazardous substances.323 Only the EPA's proposed 
rule on lender liability, however, embodies the functional approach, 
focusing attention on the legal principle advanced under the stat-
ute-the imposition of liability on those persons responsible for im-
proper disposal of hazardous wastes. 324 Because the agency has 
adopted the functional approach in its proposed rule, the outcomes 
under the rule are more likely to achieve CERCLA's objectives than 
the judicially devised standards of lender control liability. 
Because they adopt the generic definition of control, the Mirabile 
and Guidice courts put forth inaccurate standards of lender liability 
under CERCLA. In neither case did the court focus on CERCLA's 
objectives as the principal rationale upon which to support a theory 
of lender control liability.325 Instead, both courts premised liability 
on a general assertion of control by the lender over the debtor's 
business.326 
occasions had answered question of relationship between two provisions in three different 
ways). 
Second, the courts have considered the issue of lender liability and have established strong 
judicial precedent in this area of law. See, e.g., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 
732 F. Supp. 556, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (secured creditor liable if it participates in day-to-day 
management of debtor's business or facility). Thus, it is questionable whether courts will 
abandon their interpretations and adopt the EPA rule in the case of third-party suits. Rules 
to Ease Burden, supra note 318, at 4. 
321 See Sweetheart Deal, supra note 6, at 1162; id. at 1159 (comments from financial interests 
indicate concern that rule does not apply to private party lawsuits). 
322 American Bar Association Meeting, supra note 8, at 1148-49. 
323 See, e.g., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Pa. 
1989); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. 
1985). 
324 See Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,803 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
300). 
325 The courts only address CERCLA's goals in a conclusory or passing manner. See Guidice, 
732 F. Supp. at 562; Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996; see also supra note 183. 
326 Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 561-62; Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995-97. 
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In addition, and within the context of a generic approach, both 
the Mirabile and the Guidice opinions turn to the concept of control 
as it exists under corporate law and apply this standard in a secured 
financing context.327 Relying on a corporate control standard, the 
two courts based liability solely on the lenders' operational manage-
ment of the facilities. 328 The corporate control standard, however, is 
inappropriate to the determination of the CERCLA liability of a 
secured creditor. Control in the corporate context is extensive op-
erational control of a corporation by a corporate officer, for example, 
such that the two entities merge and no longer maintain separate 
corporate identities. 329 In the case of a secured creditor, however, 
the relevant control is the lender's control of the debtor's hazardous 
waste disposal activities. The danger of applying a corporate control 
standard to a lender with the potential for CERCLA liability is that 
a court may not allow for a safe harbor to protect necessary lending 
activities. Moreover, the court's sweeping inquiry into the lender's 
operational control may fail to target the lender conduct that CER-
CLA deems to be reprehensible. Mirabile, and to a greater extent 
Guidice, recognized that lenders engage in certain conduct to protect 
their security interests, and that the exemption protects these in-
dicia of control. 330 The Mirabile and Guidice standards are flawed, 
however, because they focus' too broadly on indicia of operational 
control. The courts' standards fail to require that a lender exert 
control over a debtor's waste disposal activities before there is a 
finding of liability. 331 
Under the standards that the Guidice and Mirabile courts artic-
ulated, some lenders may escape punishment. Because the standards 
prohibit scrutiny of indicia of financial control, courts may overlook 
evidence revealing lender control of waste disposal decisions. On the 
other hand, some lenders may be unfairly subjected to CERCLA 
327 Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995; see Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562. 
328 Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562; Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995. 
329 See, e.g., Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665,670-71 (D. Idaho 1986) (appropriate 
inquiries under corporate analysis are whether subsidiary carried on its own business and 
whether parent and subsidiary observed corporate formalities). 
330 Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 561-62; Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996; accord In re 
Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668,672-73 (9th Cir. 1990). 
331 Courts that have determined CERCLA liability in the corporate law context, however, 
also have considered whether the parent corporation or corporate officer had authority to 
control the subservient corporation's handling and disposal of hazardous substances. See, e.g., 
United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1986); 
Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672. The Mirabile and Guidice courts did not adopt this aspect 
of the corporate law analysis. 
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liability. Although a lender may exert substantial control over a 
debtor's business operations, the lender may not have participated 
specifically in or controlled the debtor's treatment of hazardous 
wastes. The generic approach therefore does not target successfully 
those who are responsible for the release of hazardous substances. 
The Fleet Factors decision has been the subject of an enormous 
amount of criticism and debate. 332 Although some of these comments 
are well founded, the decision is not entirely without merit because 
the reasoning that the court of appeals adopted in Fleet Factors 
perhaps most closely resembles the reasoning that the functional 
analysis requires. The court focused, at least initially, on the inter-
action between the lender's conduct and the disposal of hazardous 
wastes. 333 The scope of the Fleet Factors court's rule, however, is 
far too broad. The court expressly stated that, to find lender liability, 
its standard does not require a lender to be involved in the decisions 
regarding the treatment of hazardous wastes. 334 It is sufficient under 
the Fleet Factors standard to show that general indicia of lender 
control lead to the inference that a lender may have had the capacity 
to control these decisions. 335 
In the end, therefore, the Fleet Factors court embraced the ge-
neric concept of control. Because it requires no specific evidence of 
control of the waste disposal practices, the Fleet Factors standard 
imposes liability on lenders who exert control over their debtors 
regardless of whether they exert control over the debtor practices 
that CERCLA deems reprehensible. In other words, the standard 
allows courts to premise liability on evidence of lender control that 
is wholly unrelated to improper waste disposal activities. Moreover, 
the court of appeals decision in Fleet Factors provides no protection 
332 See Eleventh Circuit Expands CERCLA Liability to Cover Secured Creditor's Interest 
in Firm, 21 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 307, 308 (June 8, 1990) ("decision 
transforms lenders into 'environmental police"'); Fleet Factors Complains to Supreme Court 
that CERCLA Ruling Disrupts Commercial Lending, 21 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 1116, 1117 (Oct. 5, 1990) (ruling will make banking industry increasingly reluctant to 
lend and therefore will result in more bankruptcies); Legislative Changes Necessary After 
Fleet Factors Case, Lawyer Says, 21 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. 907, 907 (Sept. 14, 
1990) ("court's pronouncement tagged lenders as deep pockets to fund the costs of cleaning 
up the environment"); Lender Liability Under Superfund Law Will Not Be Reviewed by 
Supreme Court, 21 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1675, 1675 (Jan. 18, 1991) 
(decision has left banking and lending community anxious about liability). 
333 See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir.), reh'g 
denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). 
334 I d. at 1558. 
335 Id. 
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for the typical and customary indicia of lender control. 336 The end 
result under the Fleet Factors standard is that far too many lenders 
will be unfairly subject to CERCLA liability. 337 
Application of a pure functional approach, on the other hand, to 
the facts in Fleet Factors would have achieved CERCLA's goals. 
The functional approach would not have allowed the court to premise 
liability on instances of lender control that were unrelated to the 
disposal of hazardous wastes, such as the lender's setting the price 
for the debtor's excess inventory and processing the debtor's tax 
forms.338 For example, the court of appeals in Fleet Factors would 
have been precluded from finding liability during the post-default 
period because the government did not present any evidence of 
lender control that was even remotely connected to the disposal of 
hazardous wastes. To find liability under a functional approach, 
therefore, the court would have been forced to require evidence of 
actual lender control over the debtor's waste disposal activities 
rather than a mere inference of control. 
In addition, the court of appeals in Fleet Factors should have 
taken into account the lender's need to protect its interests in the 
debtor's property, especially during the foreclosure period. 339 Al-
though a safe harbor could not have protected Fleet from responsi-
bility for any environmental damage that it might have caused by 
moving drums that were filled with hazardous chemicals, a safe 
harbor would have allowed Fleet to engage in an environmentally 
cautious foreclosure and sale of the debtor's property without trig-
gering CERCLA liability. 
The EPA's proposed rule wholeheartedly embraces the functional 
approach. The rule requires evidence of lender control over a debt-
or's improper disposal of hazardous wastes. 340 As a result, the rule 
targets only the behavior that falls within the purview of CERCLA. 
The rule produces accurate outcomes because it achieves CERCLA's 
goals of punishing lenders who exert control over their debtors' 
336 See id. at 1557--58. Although the court alluded to the normal course of dealing between 
debtors and creditors, id. at 1556, the standard that it articulated provides no recognition for 
those control activities that are necessary to protect lenders' interests, see id. at 1557--58. In 
fact, the court dismis~ed the distinction between financial and operational management and 
permitted scrutiny of both. [d. at 1557. 
337 See Legislative Changes Necessary After Fleet Factors Case, Lawyer Says, 21 [Current 
Developments] 907, 907 (Sept. 14, 1990). 
338 See id. at 1559. 
339 See id. at 1559-60. 
340 See Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,803 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
300). 
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waste disposal activities, not their debtors' employment practices or 
tax forms. In addition, the rule recognizes that the security interest 
exemption is meaningless unless lenders can engage in the customary 
loan management practices that ordinarily accompany a security 
interest. 341 Thus, the proposed rule provides a safe harbor so that 
lenders can undertake those activities that are typically associated 
with the protection of a security interest without the fear of CER-
CLA liability. 
VI. ApPLICATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS TO CERCLA's 
SECURITY INTEREST EXEMPTION 
Financial transactions depend upon certainty and predictability. 
Lender liability under CERCLA, however, is nothing but unpre-
dictable. Lenders are unclear about the parameters of management 
within which they may operate and avoid liability.342 Judicial inter-
pretations of the CERCLA security interest exemption do not pro-
vide any additional guidance to lenders.343 Because debtor-creditor 
relationships typically entail various degrees of lender control, lend-
ers fear that their normal involvement with debtors may be sufficient 
to incur the potentially huge liabilities associated with CERCLA 
cleanup activities. 344 In fact, eighty-eight percent of the banks sur-
veyed by the American Bankers Association have changed their 
credit practices in an attempt to avoid environmental liability. 345 
These changes in lending procedures have led to a reduction of 
available credit for those businesses that present environmental 
risks. 346 Therefore, neither the lending nor the borrowing community 
341 Id. at 28,803-06. 
342 See Eleventh Circuit Rejects Request to Rehear Fleet Factors' Liability Issue, 21 
[Current Developments] 536, 536 (July 27, 1990) [hereinafter Eleventh Circuit Rejects Re-
quest]. 
343 See supra notes 165-295 and accompanying text. 
344 See Fleet Factors Complains to Supreme Court that CERCLA Ruling Disrupts Com-
mercial Lending, 21 [Current Developments] 1116, 1116 (Oct. 5, 1990). For example, there 
is a Superfund site in the western United States with cleanup costs that are estimated to be 
between $7 and $10 million. 136 CONGo REC. E1023 (daily ed. April 4, 1990) (statement of 
Rep. LaFalce). 
345 See Sweetheart Deal, supra note 6, at 1160; see also John M. Campbell, Jr., Lender 
Liability Under Superfund: Deep Pockets Don't Always Yield Free Goods, ENVTL. FORUM, 
Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 5, 5-7. Examples of modified lending practices include requiring environ-
mental audits as a precondition to financing, factoring cleanup costs into loans, setting more 
stringent cash flow requirements, and requiring cleanup as a condition of financing. Campbell, 
supra, at 7. 
346 See Sweetheart Deal, supra note 6, at 1160. 
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will be able to function effectively until the courts, Congress, or the 
EPA establishes a clear standard of lender liability. 
The insufficient and nonuniform judicial interpretations of the se-
curity interest exemption that have plagued the lending community 
with uncertainty and chaos are the result of a generic approach to 
the concept of lender control liability. Under a generic analysis, any 
indicia of lender control may trigger CERCLA liability. Although 
the generic approach facilitates easy analysis, it is inadequate for a 
number of reasons. First, the approach misconceives and ignores 
the underlying purposes or rationales distinct to each theory of 
lender liability.347 If a court does not identify the underlying premise 
for liability in a lender liability case, it will not be able legitimately 
to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable indicia of lender control. 
Second, a generic view of control encourages inaccurate references 
to other theories of lender liability, thereby diluting the distinct 
nature of each theory.348 The result is an overemphasis on control 
and too little emphasis on the actual theory of liability propounded. 349 
Lastly, whether control is evidenced by loan documentation or ad-
ministration, all lenders seeking to protect their financial interests 
will exert some form of control over their debtors.350 Therefore, it 
is not enough to apply a generic concept of control under a theory 
of lender liability. The generic approach allows courts to ignore the 
necessity of certain control techniques that enable a lender to in-
crease the likelihood that it will recover its funds. 
In order to reduce uncertainty under the exemption and thereby 
begin to ease the credit crunch, courts should adopt a functional 
approach to the concept of lender control under CERCLA. The 
functional approach would require identification of the indicia of 
lender control that are relevant to CERCLA's theory of liability, 
and would foster recognition of the lender's inherent position of 
control. 
In interpreting a statute under the functional approach, courts 
must identify the statute's theory of liability. CERCLA seeks to 
impose liability on those who are responsible for the improper dis-
posal of hazardous substances.351 If a person-which CERCLA de-
fines to include both individuals and corporations-generates, trans-
347 Lawrence, supra note 27, at 186. 
348 [d. at 186-87. 
349 See id. at 187. 
3IiO See supra notes 27--58 and accompanying text. 
351 United States v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1461, 1467 (D. Del. 1990). 
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ports, or arranges for the treatment or disposal of hazardous 
substances in a manner that contaminates the environment, then 
that person has engaged in wrongful conduct under the statutory 
scheme.352 CERCLA therefore imposes liability on those who exert 
control over the handling and disposal of hazardous wastes. 353 In 
light of this objective, courts must examine the indicia of lender 
control in a particular case and determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the lender asserted control over its 
debtor's waste disposal decisions. Under this analysis, the lender 
will not "void the exemption" unless it has exerted control over the 
debtor's improper disposal of wastes. 
The functional approach therefore provides fixed parameters to 
the security interest exemption. Under the approach, lenders would 
be able to rely on the fact that they could avoid liability by not 
participating in decisions regarding the disposal and treatment of 
hazardous wastes. Thus, lender liability under CERCLA no longer 
would be the wild card in a deck of credit risks. 
For guidance on application of the functional approach, courts 
should turn to the EPA's proposed rule on lender liability under 
CERCLA. The rule premises liability on lenders' control of their 
debtors' waste disposal activities. 354 In addition, the rule creates a 
safe harbor in which the lending community can pursue its normal 
course of business. 355 The rule effectively achieves CERCLA's goals 
by targeting only those lenders who are responsible for the improper 
disposal of hazardous wastes. Although, at present, the rule only 
applies to EPA suits, courts also should consider using the rule in 
the context of private party suits. 
Some would argue that this Comment puts forth a construction of 
the CERCLA security interest exemption that conflicts with a long-
standing legal maxim-that in order to achieve the goals of a re-
medial statute, such as CERCLA, courts should construe ambiguous 
statutory terms broadly so as to favor liability.356 In fact, some critics 
of the EPA's proposed rule believe that the rule does not clarify the 
exemption but instead expands it. 357 These critics do not understand 
352 United States v. N.E. Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 744 (8th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
353 See id. at 743. 
354 Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,803 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
355 ld. at 28,803-06. 
356 See United States v. Kayser-Roth Co., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (lst Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 
S. Ct. 957 (1991); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.), reh'g 
denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990) (en bane), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). 
357 See Sweetheart Deal, supra note 6, at 1159. 
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the structure of CERCLA's liability provisions. Although CERCLA 
imposes strict liability on, among others, owners and operators of a 
facility, the statute also provides an exemption from the strict lia-
bility standard for secured creditors. 358 The security interest exemp-
tion therefore creates another category of PRPs-secured creditors. 
Lenders are not owners, because they possess only a security inter-
est.359 Lenders who void the exemption cannot be liable as operators, 
because operator liability is provided for elsewhere in the statute-
to hold otherwise would render the exemption mere surplusage. 360 
The purpose of the security interest exemption is not to increase 
lenders' exposure to liability, as suggested by the Fleet Factors 
court,361 but rather to distinguish lenders from other PRPs. Lenders 
not only hold a unique interest in property but also develop intimate 
business relations with their debtors.362 As the Bergsoe court noted, 
the exemption is meaningless unless lenders are allowed to engage 
in certain activities that are common to lending relationships and 
necessary to protect security interests. 363 Therefore, rather than 
impose strict liability on lenders, the security interest exemption 
instructs courts to apply a lender control analysis to determine lia-
bility. Although the lender liability analysis differs from that which 
is applied to owners and operators, lenders are not subject to any 
lesser standard of care. If a lender, as a result of its control activities, 
is responsible for a release of hazardous substances, then a court 
will hold that lender jointly and severally liable for all response costs. 
Lenders, however, are not environmental watchdogs. The purpose 
of lending institutions is to finance investments and businesses, not 
to ensure that debtors comply with environmental laws and regula-
tions. 364 As the EPA's proposed rule explains, "a security holder is 
not expected to be an insurer or guarantor of environmental safety 
at a facility in which it has a security interest. "365 Lenders are liable 
358 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601(20)(A), 9607(a) (1988). 
359 See supra notes 34, 133 and accompanying text. 
360 See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 
911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). But see Guidice v. 
BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561-62 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (lender liability 
premised on control of operations and production at debtor's facility); United States v. Mira-
bile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (lender who carries 
out operational functions at the facility voids exemption). 
361 See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558 n.ll. 
362 See supra notes 27-;')9 and accompanying text. 
363 In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668,672 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Eleventh Circuit 
Rejects Request, supra note 342, at 536. 
364 But see Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558-;')9. 
366 Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,804 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
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only for certain of their actions-their exertions of decisionmaking 
or management control over their debtor's hazardous waste disposal 
decisions. Lenders are not liable for inaction-they have no duty to 
force a debtor to manage its facility in an environmentally sound 
manner. 
In reality, however, because environmental liabilities often cause 
debtors to become insolvent and default on loans, many lenders now 
insist upon cleanup and continued compliance as conditions of fi-
nancing in order to reduce the credit risk associated with debtors 
whose activities may cause harm to the environment. 366 Although 
some lenders may act out of a sincere concern for the environment, 
most impose compliance requirements in order to protect their se-
curity interests. The decision to act therefore is within the discretion 
of the lender. Congress did not design CERCLA to create a federal 
squadron of environmental police consisting of secured creditors. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Application of a functional analysis to CERCLA's security interest 
exemption will allow the courts to ferret out those lenders who have 
assumed control over their debtors' waste disposal activities. Courts 
then will be able to assign liability for cleanup costs to those lenders 
who have increased the burdens on an already severely contaminated 
environment. Moreover, the functional analysis will fix the parame-
ters of the security interest exemption. Lenders will be able to plan 
their involvement with debtors so as to avoid liability. By reducing 
the uncertainty and risk of lender liability, capital should begin to 
flow more freely and eventually ease the CERCLA-driven credit 
crunch. 
366 See Campbell, supra note 345, at 7. 
